


JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military Affairs



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Soviet Union

Military Affairs

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Colonel General Grachev on Protecting Servicemen

91UM0849A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Sep 91

[Interview with Colonel General P. Grachev conducted by TASS correspondent V. Gondusov: "The President of Russia Is True to His Promise"]

[Text] The order of the president of the RSFSR "Increased Social Protection for Servicemen Serving on the Territory of the RSFSR" has been published in the press. What motivated its appearance? This was the question with which TASS correspondent V. Gondusov began his interview with Colonel General P. Grachev, first deputy defense minister of the USSR and chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defense:

[Grachev] A few days ago I reported to B.N. Yeltsin that following the well-known events, everyone who felt so inclined was rushing to conduct his own investigation of the actions of army personnel at the time of the coup d'etat. Suspicion in respect of servicemen was being fanned in every possible way. This was irritating the army collectives, particularly the command personnel. Instead of engaging in planned combat training, many generals and officers had detached themselves from their work, and everyone was worried by the thought of what would happen to him next.

The president of the RSFSR suggested that I prepare an order which prohibited all except the competent authorities from conducting investigations. He recommended here that the document reflect the viewpoint of the republic leadership concerning the USSR Armed Forces: Fully supporting them, the RSFSR Government wishes to see our army and navy strong, well trained, and well supplied.

Boris Nikolayevich had earlier also expressed the opinion that the USSR Armed Forces should be united. But the days of the coup persuaded us that there is a need for the creation in Russia of a military formation of the national guard type, which should exist on a clear-cut legal basis.

Such is the source data by which the RSFSR State Committee for Defense was guided in drawing up the order. Subsequently the problems broached therein will be specified in the corresponding edict of the president of Russia.

[Gondusov] Pavel Sergeyevich, the order cited a number of documents which are to be implemented on the territory of Russia....

[Grachev] It is a question of accelerating the preparation of the RSFSR draft laws "Social Safeguards for Servicemen on the Territory of the RSFSR," "Extra-Army (Alternative) Service of Citizens of the RSFSR," and others. They are all at the preparation stage, but work on the bills is in full swing, and it is hoped that they will very

shortly be presented for discussion in the committees and commissions of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

Things are more complex when it comes to the plan for military reform, with which the order also deals. I confess that performing such a volume of work is currently beyond the capabilities of our committee. We therefore propose that our efforts be combined with specialists of the USSR Defense Ministry and that politicians and economists, lawyers and sociologists be enlisted in this work.

[Gondusov] What kind of resources will be channeled into fulfillment of the order?

[Grachev] Resources of the USSR Defense Ministry, in the main. In addition, it is proposed to create under the auspices of the RSFSR Council of Ministers a special fund wholly intended for the social protection of the servicemen. We have been promised that there will be money for the fund.

Other sources of financing will be attracted also. The order speaks of some of them. Regulations governing the formation of economic relations of Soviet Army units and the organs of state power locally are at the development stage, for example. There is broad scope here for participation in joint transport companies, construction enterprises, and agricultural operations. The channeling of a considerable amount of the income thus obtained into a special servicemen's insurance fund is envisaged here.

The money will go mainly into a solution of the housing problem. At B.N. Yeltsin's suggestion, the main amounts will be channeled where the housing situation is worst; for example, to regions where forces have arrived from overseas and have found themselves in limbo, so to speak.

The order envisages the participation in the local organs of power of the corresponding commanding officers, starting with combined-unit commanders, for the exercise of control of the expenditure of the resources. Their task will be to look specifically into the problems of the life and social conditions of the servicemen and display the utmost concern for them.

Of course, fulfillment of the order of the president of Russia is within the compass of our state committee. We will travel to the localities, collate the corresponding information, and report to the president.

[Gondusov] Pavel Sergeyevich, how do you evaluate the appearance of such a document?

[Grachev] As of exceptional significance. And this is not only my opinion, for that matter. When, on the eve of the signing, I read it to members of the USSR Defense Ministry Board, they broke into applause, believe it or not. The best response is coming from the troops. According to a report of one commander, the order has evoked a storm of enthusiasm among people.

I will say for truth's sake that the document has evoked mistrust and caution in a number of leaders: Will it all not just remain on paper? I believe our state committee has to do everything here to change people's minds.

I will say this also. In the course of his election campaign, Boris Nikolayevich promised servicemen an improvement in their social protection. Time has shown that the president has remained true to his promise, and his popularity among the military has risen considerably. And the first days following the document's appearance have shown that problems which had long been at a standstill have come to be tackled successfully in the localities. This, I believe, is only the start of important work.

Political Organs Abolished in Armed Forces

91UM0845A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
31 Aug 91 Single Edition p 1

["Ukase of the president of the USSR: 'Abolition of Military-Political Organs in the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR Committee for State Security Forces, Internal Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Railroad Troops'"]

[Text]

1. To abolish military-political organs in the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR Committee for State Security Forces, internal forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Railroad Troops. To ensure upon implementation of the organizational measures strict observance of the rights and legitimate interests of the personnel of the organs being abolished.

2. That the USSR Defense Ministry and USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs will implement measures pertaining to a fundamental improvement in educational work among the troops.

3. To recognize as being null and void:

—the ukase of the president of the USSR of 8 September 1990 "Reforming of the Political Organs of the USSR Armed Forces, the USSR Committee for State Security Forces, Internal Forces of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Railroad Troops" ("Gazette of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and USSR Supreme Soviet, 37, 1990, item 711);

—the ukase of the president of the USSR of 11 January 1991 "Approval of the General Provisions Governing Military-Political Organs" ("Gazette of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR and the USSR Supreme Soviet," 3, 1991, item 75).

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, The Kremlin, Moscow, 29 August 1991.

Servicemen Polled on Political Activities

92UM0001A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 12 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by Military Sociologist, Lieutenant Colonel Viktor Deynekin: "Depolitization of the Armed Forces: To What Level?"]

[Text] De-party-ization of the army is the first step, elimination of political organs is the second step, what should the third step be? Military- sociological research results suggest: the absolute depolitization of the army is impossible in principle.

The Poll

In April 1991, the Social and Psychological Problems Research Center's Interethnic Relations Group (USSR Ministry of Defense) studied the problems of young soldiers adapting to military service. Some results of this particular applied sociological research are of definite interest in the context of the stormy events that are occurring today to reform the USSR Armed Forces.

The research was conducted at the Leningrad Military District and Leningrad Naval Base training centers. Altogether 669 cadets were polled who have been sent to the troops and to Navy ships after five-six months of service and training at the centers. I hope that the facts cited below will permit the readers to arrive at their own conclusion about why the army did not become a tool in the hands of the putsch leaders.

We grouped the responses of those polled by national-regional indicators (representatives of a region's indigenous peoples) to analyze the results of the poll: Central Asia and Kazakhstan were represented by 250 soldiers, the Caucasus by 22, and Slavs (Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians) were represented by 374 people. Other regional-national groups were not singled out due to inadequate representation. On the whole, the selection according to ethnic composition was close to the representation of national-regional groups in the army and in the navy which has developed at the present time.

We were primarily interested in the question: How great is young soldiers' interest in politics? To do this, we posed several categorical opinions to the cadets polled with which they could either completely or for the most part agree, for the most part or totally reject, or decline to answer.

Thus, the first opinion: "I am very interested in political problems and events!" Of those polled, 75 percent agreed for the most part or totally, 15 percent declined to answer, and 10 percent did not agree with it. Analysis of the results obtained indicated that interest in political problems and events is higher than average and reaches 65 percent among representatives of Central Asia and Kazakhstan and interest among representatives of the peoples of the Caucasus and Slavs is below average—68 percent.

Another opinion on this topic was worded as follows: "I willingly and frankly express my opinion on political issues." On the average, the responses were distributed as follows: 63 percent agreed, 20 percent expressed doubt, and 17 percent rejected the assertion from among the cadets we polled.

A comparison of the data cited with previous data indicates that it rises to 4/5 of those who are generally interested in politics and the frank expression of their own opinion is regarded as being among the first practical steps.

The third opinion from the "political interests" block was more specific: "I am very worried about the political events that are occurring in my republic." The average apportionment of the responses on this opinion turned out to be as follows: 88 percent agreed, six percent expressed doubt, and six percent also rejected it. Ninety one percent of the Slavs, 85 percent of the representatives of the native peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and 82 percent of the Caucasians totally or for the most part agreed with this assertion.

Please note that we did not at all touch on the content of the soldiers' political orientations and views. This is a topic for a separate conversation. In this case, the facts cited suggest one thing: it is impossible in principle to totally depoliticize the army and the navy. Because this would signify the need for each serviceman to forget his nationality, his social origin and social position, and reject, not only the right to participate in the political life of the country and his own republic, city, and the rayon in which he is performing service but, even the thought of expressing his own political views.

Rights of Soldiers To Refuse Unlawful Orders Discussed

91UM0005A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 36, Sep 91 pp 14-15

[Article by Konstantin Isakov: "We'll Fire at People and Crush Them"; first paragraph NEW TIMES comment]

[Text] With these words the commander of the leading regiment of the Bolgrad division met a Moscow Soviet delegation on the Minsk highway.

When the delegates from the Moscow Soviet's group for emergency situations asked Lieutenant-Colonel Prutchenko to read the Russian President's decree cancelling the putschist's decisions as unlawful, he crumpled up the sheet of paper given to him and threw it into their faces.

Most of the troops driven to Moscow on armoured vehicles did not know what had really happened and together with their officers they explained their appearance in the city by an order from superiors. On the first day of the putsch crowds of people surrounded the armoured personnel carriers standing in Manezh Square. A major pestered with angry shouts of protesters pulled an empty magazine out of his pistol and vowed that the

troops had not been given an order to fire on Muscovites. Such an order was not given, indeed, but those who could issue it had no doubts that, if given, it would be carried out. The system of training dutiful soldiers who were forbidden to reason for themselves has been developed over decades.

The next day, after the coup had petered out, NEW TIMES staff writers met with members of the coordinating council of the Military for Democracy movement. Many of them had been expelled from the armed forces for leaving the Communist Party or simply for democratic views. NEW TIMES put only one question to them: why did troops obediently follow the putschists and get ready, if ordered, to fire at people and crush them?

"In the civilized world," Lieutenant-Colonel of Justice Anatoly Pchelintsev said, "there are legal guarantees against the execution of an unlawful order by servicemen." For instance, the oath taken by an American soldier provides for mutual responsibility to the execution of an unlawful order, that is, an American soldier can disobey an unlawful order and apply to an inspector independent of the Defence Secretary. He can be sure that he will not be punished for disobeying an order while his application will be brought to the notice of the inspector-general and higher military authorities.

A similar practice existed in Russia. By a decree issued in 1724 Peter the Great allowed soldiers to disobey a criminal order, that is, an order directed against the legitimate power, the tsarist family. A soldier could report the criminal order given to him to higher authorities, the prosecutor-general and the tsar himself. After the October 1917 Revolution the Red Army regulations issued in 1919, 1920 and 1925 stated that a criminal order ought not to be carried out.

However, the building of a totalitarian regime called for an absolute fulfillment, by the army, too, of decisions taken by the high leadership of the country. Article 7 of the Disciplinary Manual of 1940 said that any order ought to be carried out and a commander could force subordinates to execute his order even by using arms.

When Nazi criminals were brought to trial after the war, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal was drawn up on the Soviet Union's initiative. It pointed out that an order directed against peace and humaneness as well as against a lawful government ought not to be fulfilled. However, this phrase did not appear in Soviet documents. The Disciplinary Manual of the Armed Forces of the USSR says: "An order issued by the chief is a law for his subordinate. It must be carried out without demur and by the fixed time."

"The text of the oath taken by servicemen has no mention of allegiance to the people and the Motherland," Major-General (reserve) Vladimir Dudnik said. "Instead, we swear allegiance to the Defence Minister, for one of the points of the oath states point-blank: 'I pledge to fulfill all orders of commanders and chiefs.'"

Victor Kuznetsov, Colonel of the Reserve, recalled a phrase from his conversation with Lt-Gen. Sitnikov, head of the political department at the Lenin Military Political Academy. "We must cultivate respect for authorities, for even the Nazis did the same. Are we worse than the Nazis?" He had in mind political and party rather than state authorities.

For control over commanders, and hence the army, by the party the institution of commissars was introduced during the Civil War. The commissars were guided not by laws but by party instructions. In the opinion of Colonel of the Reserve Vitaly Kovalevsky, "the political bodies in the army have been and remain none other than party authorities vested with state power, bodies of political coercion and suppression surveillance and investigation." The army has 1.1 million Communists united in 37,000 party branches.

Following the Decree on Military Political Bodies, signed by President Gorbachev last January, and in the course of the ensuing reform it was established that from then on political officers would have the task of "educating servicemen in the spirit of devotion to the policy of the state." The responsibility for such education was laid on Col-Gen. Shlyaga, head of the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy, who was appointed First Deputy Minister of Defence. But, in effect, little has changed. The Army Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Chief Political Department of the Soviet Army and Navy were "twin brothers."

Vows of allegiance to the President of the USSR were made at a national conference of party secretaries of the armed forces held a week before the coup. A few days before the coup the same vows were also made by the leaders of the army committee of the CPSU. However, right after the coup the party branches of the armed forces were ordered to mobilize Communists to carry out the decisions adopted by the State Committee for the State of Emergency.

"All the malaises of our army came to light during the putsch," Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve Vladimir Andreyev said. "The worst of them is deception of the people by political bodies, because they serve not the people and the homeland, but the interests of the Communist Party. [words missing] revolution in October 1917 most generals of the Russian Army remained loyal to the Tsar and Motherland. In August 1991 the Soviet generals backed the junta on the first day of the coup.

"The mechanism of strengthening the party's influence in the army was worked out thoroughly," Colonel of the Reserve Yuri Deryugin said. "A political instructor in the rank of colonel or lieutenant-colonel was removed from a division to the Central Committee apparatus in which he underwent political and ideological training and brainwashing. An ideologically staunch party functionary was moulded. Then he was returned to the army and appointed to work in the personnel department, in

the intelligence, the military tribunal, the chief military collegium or the military prosecutor's office. In this way the legal, political and military power was concentrated in the hands of party functionaries. A powerful military and party elite was also shaped in this way. The members of the elite naturally selected people of the same spirit, manner of behaviour, ideas and language."

When marshals begin to shoot themselves the society becomes enlightened. Measures have at last been taken to create a reliable mechanism of civilian control over the armed forces.

In the opinion of Yuri Deryugin, one of the primary tasks is to "clearly define the functions of the Defence Ministry. It should play the administrative part and act as the general staff to work out tactical and strategic planning. The Defence Ministry should be headed by a civilian. The officers' assemblies, recreated recently, should become democratic bodies of self-government. Soldiers' assemblies should be established, too. It is necessary to guarantee the legal protection of privates. Three services—military legal, socio-psychological, and recreational—must be formed in the army instead of the abolished political bodies. It is necessary to introduce a religious hour for believers and the time has come to set up the institution of chaplains," Yuri Deryugin said in conclusion.

In my opinion, the time has also come for officers—members of parliament—to retire from the ranks or, if their military career is dear for them, to withdraw from the parliament.

Lt Gen Golovnev on Actions During Coup

*91UM0853A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
10 Sep 91 Union Edition p 8*

[Report on interview with Lieutenant General Anatoliy Andreyevich Golovnev, first deputy commander of the Moscow Military District, by E. Maksimova; place and date not given: "Three Days of the Putsch. An IZVESTIYA Investigation: The Commander's Blame? The Commander's Trouble?"]

[Text] I interviewed Lt. Gen. Anatoliy Andreyevich Golovnev at his own request. The editorial office received a phone call inviting us to come in: The first deputy commander of the Moscow Military District was prepared to tell us who controlled the troops of the district during the days of the putsch and how, and who and what they were guided by.

The day before, Yu. Feofanov published an article in IZVESTIYA entitled "Is the Order a Law?" on the legal essence of a formula in the regulations which states that an order of a superior is a law for his subordinates. This conversation with the general is a warning about the vital need to urgently bring criminal codes and military regulations into compliance with international norms which give a subordinate the right not to carry out ill-intentioned instructions of the government or orders

from his superior (precisely a vital necessity because we have paid for archaic laws with three lives; it is quite by chance that the number was three, there could have been dozens, if not hundreds, of victims).

Two years ago new draft Interior Service Regulations for the USSR Armed Forces were discussed, which still have not been adopted. At the time a colonel from the Main Political Directorate called our newspaper. On the condition that his name not be mentioned, he sought that the newspaper intervene: The arguments of the authors of the draft concerning the reinstatement of an appropriate paragraph in the regulations, at least in the prewar redaction which allowed one to refuse to obey criminal orders, were categorically rejected. Minister of Defense Yazov was the first and principal opponent.

I also recalled another, recent fact during the conversation with General Golovnev. A radio commentator, apparently on "Ekho Moskv," who observed the chaotic movement of tanks through the city, suggested that generals in the Moscow Military District were either drunk or sick.

No, their minds were sober.

What kind of picture emerges from the story told by the general?

Colonel General N. Kalinin, troop commander of the Moscow Military District (by now former commander), came back from leave on Saturday 17 August. The same day, he embarked on an utterly peaceful endeavor—he walked, together with his deputy, through the ancient Catherine's park in Lefortovo, which belongs to the district, because the minister instructed him to report on the progress of restoration on a regular basis. Golovnev visited the park on Sunday as well. At the same hour Kalinin was summoned to see Yazov, after which he called his first deputy at home urgently ordering him to report for duty in connection with the emerging aggravation of the situation and the possible introduction of troops to the capital.

Both of them spent the night at the headquarters. At 0430 Anatoliy Andreyevich was awakened by an assistant of the officer on duty. He explained, not quite intelligibly, that a report had been received on the organization of a committee to save the Motherland. Several minutes later the commander's instructions followed: Stand ready to move forward the 2d and 4th Divisions to prevent disturbances; the minister has ordered an enhanced state of readiness.

Golovnev went to the 4th Kantemir Armor Division, and Kirsanov to the 2d Taman Motorized Rifle Division. These are famous Guard units; we are used to seeing them on parade. They are billeted nearby, between 50 and 80 kilometers away from the capital, and prepared to offer assistance in the event of a disaster, a natural calamity, or any emergency situation which threatens peace in the city. This is how the minds of soldiers and officers have always been conditioned.

Golovnev arrived at the Kantemir Division at 0605. The division had already been alerted and put on combat ready status. He reported to the commander, who announced:

"We have orders to take important facilities under protection—the TETS [Heat and Electric Power Station], the telegraph building, the White House, the Moscow Soviet, and the General Staff... To begin with the 4th will stop in the area of Teplyy Stan, and the 2d on parade grounds."

The grounds are on Leningrad Avenue—the former Khodynskoye Field where they trained for parades.

A considerably reduced contingent of the divisions was moved forward—3,809 men, or one-fifth (the rest were in field camps or harvesting potatoes). There were 362 tanks, 279 BMP's [Infantry Fighting Vehicles], 148 armored personnel carriers, and 430 repair and medical vehicles, gasoline tankers, and so on.

Golovnev went on to say: "The task set for the commanders was unambiguous—to protect, to prevent bloodshed, to ensure the normal functioning of the city. There were no 'suppression' objectives."

They began to move out at 0700, and the movement continued for as long as 12 hours. The average speed was 5 to 6 kilometers per hour. After all, the business day had already begun, and traffic was heavy on highways leading to Moscow. They thought about nothing else but seeing to it that nobody was mangled or crushed.

"Had I, when I commanded a division, proceeded even to exercises at this rate of speed, I would have been relieved of my post. The most muddle-headed platoon leader would not have thought up this stupidity—moving tanks in broad daylight from Alabino and Naro-Fominsk to Tverskaya Street."

Detachments moved along the road, and everything changed as they went. They detailed and assigned which company was to advance specifically where. The last tank came to its position and was parked by 1830. An hour earlier, at 1740, the district commander had already ordered some units to leave—at Borodino and Crimean Bridges and in Orekhovo-Borisovo and Tushino. At dawn the hard-to-understand rushing about of military vehicles began, which made journalists suspicious. As it was, they did not know what was happening in the office of the commander, where his deputies reported on the situation. The people were outraged: They came into the streets after work and found tanks there. Young people were particularly agitated. However, no threatening disturbances were registered. Therefore, what was this show for—to inflame passions?

The generals came to a unanimous conclusion: There was no justifiable need for the presence of the troops. However, they had their orders.

On one hand they had continuous communication with the White House and General K. Kobets, minister of

defense of Russia, whose instructions the commanders, in the words of Kobets himself, endeavored to carry out. There were contacts with the Moscow Soviet, from which a representative, a captain first rank, came to ascertain that the troops had indeed been ordered to pull out in stages. On the other hand, there were incessant instructions from higher up and calls to come to the minister.

On the evening of 19 August the minister gave instructions to immediately impose a curfew in the city. Kalinin dragged it out for a day. We Muscovites remember what kind of day it was.

Golovnev, returning from yet another trip through the streets, advised Kalinin quite firmly to calm the citizens, speak on the radio, and announce the withdrawal of the troops. Golovnev was openly afraid of any "spark." One was enough to start a fire. Ural trucks carrying ammunition were parked in the very inferno, next to the White House, and soldiers were being generously treated to booze in order to keep them warm. There could be a random shot, a Molotov cocktail thrown, and the city would be in peril.

Golovnev proposed to the captain first rank: Let us move the Ural trucks out. But how can powerful vehicles, jampacked with shells, leave their location in a thick crowd of people? The Moscow Soviet representative did not bring himself to give the "go ahead." The commander's instructions "Sequence of the Withdrawal of Units from Downtown Moscow and Return to Permanent Bases," which they showed me, included a separate line: "The Tank Battalion of the 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Regiment—the Kalinin Bridge—blocked by the population next to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet building."

Kalinin appeared on the "Vremya" program on the evening of 20 August, but with a completely different statement—on imposing a curfew. This happened after yet another acrimonious conversation with Yazov.

A curfew in a city as huge as Moscow is a complicated operation. Golovnev explained that in order for this to occur, several more divisions and at least two weeks to prepare would have been needed. One million passes alone would have to be printed in order not to shut down plants and close shops.

He was unable to respond to my question: What was the minister of defense, an old career servicemen, counting on when he issued such a ridiculously nonsensical order? However, he fittingly recalled an instructive telephone conversation:

—What are we to do? Pardon me, but there is nowhere for soldiers to go and take a leak on Manezh Square and at the bridges. (This was Kalinin asking Yazov).

—Look into it yourself and check out the yards... (This is the marshal responding to the colonel general).

On this night of curfew not a single person was apprehended in Moscow. Concerned managers of enterprises called the headquarters. They were told that there would be no restrictions. Military commandants of rayons called: What was to be done? Nothing. Actually, a curfew was not imposed. It was only expected that patrols would be posted on the intersections of the Garden Ring Road, through which a convoy of BMP's moved from Mayakovskiy Square on the eve of 21 August.

Indeed, the curfew was likewise make-believe. However, this ominous make-believe claimed three lives. Militia cars could have moved next to the BMP's, each carrying a deputy with a loudspeaker. They could have notified citizens that the soldiers did not intend to storm the White House (to begin with, when the BMP's entered the tunnel under Kalinin Avenue, there was only one way left for them to go—straight ahead to Smolensk Square), and that their mission, patrolling, was different.

This was the arrangement with the militia which assumed the role of corporal of the guard. However, militia cars failed to appear on the Garden Ring Road. The soldiers did not know or expect that there were barricades ahead, and that they would soon enter a sea of humanity.

"We should be grateful to the mechanic-driver of the BMP which was set on fire by a bottle with gasoline for having the presence of mind in that complete hell to turn on a fire control system. It would have been quite an explosion... After all, they had combat supplies, shells inside."

"Anatoliy Andreyevich, why were the BMP's combat-loaded? Did you intend to shoot?"

"Not at all. This was far from our minds. Of course, this is a difficult thing, it sort of characterizes us badly. However, please understand that we must carry out our combat mission as the manuals instruct."

Let us sum up. The tanks entered Moscow, despite the command of the district disapproving of the action and not wanting a confrontation between the Army and citizens. Golovnev:

"They once again made us scapegoats and made us choose between our military duty and our civic duty. You are damned if you do and damned if you don't. We are always and invariably in error. I spoke later at an emergency session of the Moscow Soviet. They yelled at me: 'The workers understood everything, the students understood, but you, the generals, did not?' It is easy to yell, and it is impossible to do your duty. The commander was retired to the reserves. Could you tell me what he is guilty of?"

I cannot. This is the goal of an investigation into the case of the putsch victims.

Public Opinion Poll on Attitudes Toward Military
91SV0124B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Sep 91
Union Edition p 4

[Article by A. Levinson under the "Poll" rubric: "Cult of the Army at a Time of Crisis"]

[Text] Barracks socialism, a term used by Marx as a kind of curse, became the most accurate definition of the regime that took power "under the banner of Marxism" in a number of countries of Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The role of Russia in the spread and support of this regime is well known. It would at least be honorable to play such a role in dismantling it. But it is very difficult.

It is also difficult in view of the high degree of militarization of the society where the cult of armed forces was planted. Thus, just a year ago 28 percent of the people in the USSR believed that the Army's system is a model for the organization of the society (47 percent did not agree with this) and just six months ago about one-fourth of the citizens of the Russian Republic wanted the Army "to take control of the situation in Russia" (more than 60 percent were against this).

Particular "confidence of the people in the Army" is not an original Russian tradition but a feature of this kind of regime, whether it be in Cambodia, the GDR, or Cuba. It is not the result of history but comes from propaganda. This is why it exists separately from the political reality. In Russian public opinion, it did not experience the same steady decline that the authority of almost all central structures and institutions went through. In December 1989, December 1990, and even March 1991, 44-46 percent of Russians had full confidence in the Army (34 percent by July).

No institution evoked the degree of confidence that the Army did but neither did any institution induce such a divergence of opinions among different age groups. Whereas among the younger generations the share having full confidence exceeded the share of those having no confidence at all by a factor of 1.6 (and sometimes it was less than this), among older people this predominance was by a factor of 16 or more.

Last year, 64 percent of male pensioners believed that the Soviet Armed Forces were "the most effective in the world" or at least "on a par with the best armies of the world," and only the remaining almost 40 percent were convinced that the combat effectiveness of the USSR Armed Forces is at a "very low level." People who have just finished their service in the Army may be considered in the society as one of the most competent groups in such matters. The only ones more competent than they are those who serve now: army officers and employees of law-enforcement agencies. Their position is practically the same (35 percent).

The farther this trusting soul is from the real life of the barracks, the stronger is this thoughtless confidence.

Among the elderly, most (44 percent) think that the main influence of the Army on young people is that it strengthens them morally and physically, whereas among the generation of those who have finished their active duty a majority of 64 percent said that the Army harms young people morally and physically.

Those who will build or reform the Army in Russia may be bothered by the post-August euphoria. The behavior of the Army during the days of the putsch—very inconsistent overall—brought about an "improvement of their attitude toward the Army" for one-fourth of the Muscovites and 30 percent of the citizens of Russia (the attitude of 12 percent worsened and a large share—50 percent—experienced no change in their previous attitude). This is an upsurge of the former confidence; again the older generation and women are striving twice as actively as young people and families of military people toward the accustomed symbols of the authority of power and order.

The cult of the Army is not a concern about military people and military affairs but a means of covering up the lack of this concern. Radical military reform, which, according to the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, is supported by no less than two-thirds of the society, must demilitarize the society and thereby help create an effective army.

DOSA AF Central Committee Plenum Held

91SV0124A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 38, Sep 91 (signed to press 17 Sep 91) p
2

[Article under the "In the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee" rubric: "On the Threshold of Important Decisions"]

[Text] The USSR DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] Central Committee Presidium held a meeting in Moscow. There they examined the question of the work of committees and organizations of the USSR DOSAAF under the present conditions and measures for the further democratization of the work of the defense society.

The meeting was opened by Colonel General N.N. Kotlovtshev, chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee. In his address, he stressed that the committees, organizations, and enterprises of the defense society in all Union republics and oblasts and krais of the Russian Federation resolutely condemned the anticonstitutional coup and participated in mass meetings of protest, acting in close contact with legally elected authorities. DOSAAF workers demonstrated outstanding citizenship and patriotism in these decisive days for the fate of the Motherland. The fact that the society did not support the conspirators and did not allow itself to be drawn into actions against the people is the best argument in favor of its democratic and truly national character.

They also characterized in detail the actions of the leadership of the defense society in this complex situation and in connection with the fact that the editor's office of the journal *ZA RULEM* published a statement calling for its resignation.

What happened in reality?

On 19 August at an operational meeting of the leaders of subdivisions of the organization of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, they collectively worked out and made a decision. Its essence was that in view of doubts about the constitutional formation of the emergency committee, one should not express any support for it or allow the use of the authority and material base of the defense society in its interests. They immediately sent to the localities a telegram that called for the committees to increase their vigilance and to preclude the possibility of the unsanctioned use of weapons and equipment belonging to the DOSAAF.

All of this gave reason for the bureau of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium in its meeting on 30 August to analyze its actions in the emergency situation and to draw the conclusion that the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee did not support the actions of the unconstitutional emergency committee, which also allowed the committees and organizations of the defense society to come out on the side of democratic forces.

"Of course in assessing the actions of the leadership of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee now...it is necessary to be self-critical in acknowledging, N. Kotlovtshev stressed, that they were inadequate. We could have acted more promptly, energetically, and boldly."

There was also a serious and critical conversation at the meeting about the prospects for further action by the defense society and about problems having to do with its future. Well, this is not surprising. The situation in the country has changed fundamentally after the rout of the putsch.

The events of the recent past, the decisions of the Fifth Extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR, and the abrupt changes in the state and social order of the country have now established real premises for the reorganization of the USSR DOSAAF under completely new principles and for its conversion from a centralized society to an independent self-administered organization. This relates to the nature as well as to the organizational structure of the defense society. Its future has become clearer than before: it is on the path of democracy, self-development, and independent social initiative.

One cannot fail to see that the previous society no longer exists. The republics have received real independence and sovereignty. And henceforth their defense organizations have the right to determine for themselves the forms and methods of their work.

At the same time, the opinion was expressed that the preservation of a union of sovereign states and unified armed forces also dictates the common objective of all DOSAAF organizations—to contribute to the defense of the new union. It thereby remains possible to preserve the All-Union character of the defense society.

At the meeting of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, they stressed the necessity under these conditions of establishing a Central Coordinating Council of the society, which could unite the efforts of the defense organizations of the sovereign republics. But such a council must include representatives of all republic defense organizations joining the union.

In connection with the scope of the democratic reforms in the country and the expansion of the functions of the defense organization to include general functions rather than just the promotion of defense, the question was raised of a new name for the society and the urgent need to make refinements and changes in the existing wording of its statute.

In the decree of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium on the question under discussion, it is noted that in the period of the coup by the emergency committee, the committees of the country's defense society did not support its unconstitutional actions. On the basis of the instructions of the leadership of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, they guaranteed calm and order in the schools, sports-technical clubs, and aviation and other organizations of the society, and did not permit the use of aircraft, motor vehicles, and other equipment in the interests of the conspirators.

Members of the defense society participated in mass meetings protesting the overthrow of a legally elected president of the country, were in the ranks of those defending the House of the Soviets of the RSFSR, and duplicated the ukases of the president of the RSFSR and disseminated them through the available facilities and means of communications.

At the same time, under the conditions of increased rumors, isolated attempts at "witch hunts," and the application of all kinds of "labels," some collectives (the journal *ZA RULEM* and its supplements *AMS* and *MOTO*) and individual mass media gave an incorrect interpretation of the role and place of the USSR DOSAAF in the days of the putsch.

Considering the new social and political situation in the country and the declaration of sovereignty and independence by the republics, the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium decided to convene and hold the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Seventh Plenum in Moscow in October 1991. It is planned to present the following questions for discussion:

—on the work of the committees and organizations of the USSR DOSAAF under the current conditions and measures for the further improvement of the work of the defense society;

—on partial changes in the statute of the USSR DOSAAF;

—on the establishment of a defense organization RSFSR DOSAAF.

Organizational matters will also be examined.

Taking into account the discussion that took place, it is found necessary to give support to the members of the bureau of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium and to demand that they be more active in reorganizing the work of the defense society.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium unanimously expressed its disagreement with the unproved statement of the collective of the editor's office of the journal ZA RULEM and its supplements AMS and MOTO to the effect that "...through its inaction and shameless desire to maintain silence in these cursed days, the society, calling itself patriotic, actually went over to the side of the conspirators."

The Central Committee of the DOSAAF of the Union republics recommends to the kray and oblast committees of the DOSAAF that they analyze in depth their own actions in the emergency situation and take all measures locally to carry out the important tasks and to ensure harmonious and coordinated work with state agencies and public organizations in the training of workers and young people for labor and the defense of the Fatherland.

The USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium entrusted A.I. Anokhin, deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee, with the temporary performance of the duties of first deputy chairman of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee.

New Afghan Veterans' Affairs Chief Profiled

91SV0111A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Sep 91
Union Edition p 3

[Article by V. Litovkin: "Minister for 'Afgantsy'"]

[Text] **Ruslan Aushev has been appointed chairman of the USSR president's Committee for Soldier-Internationalists' Affairs by an ukase of M.S. Gorbachev.**

Biographical information about Aushev is contained in the encyclopedic dictionary *Heroes of the Soviet Union*. He was born in 1954 in Kokchetav Oblast, Kazakhstan, where at that time the Ingush people lived, resettled from their homeland at Stalin's direction. He graduated from the Higher Combined-Arms School and the Frunze Academy. He was in Afghanistan twice: the first time as battalion chief of staff and commander, and the second time as regimental chief of staff. He was wounded.

His last duty station was the Primorye, as chief of the combat training department of an formation [obyedineniye]. He is married and has two children. He is a USSR people's deputy and is a colonel. In connection with the appointment to the post of committee chairman, he has been assigned to the Armed Forces reserve.

What does Ruslan Aushev see as the meaning of his new job? How will the functions of the Committee for Soldier-Internationalists' Affairs differ from the functions of the committee of the same name in the USSR Supreme Soviet, especially since they are located in the same building and on the same floor, on opposite sides of the hallway? Our conversation began with these questions.

"The difference between our committees is fundamental," stated Ruslan Sultanovich. "The Supreme Soviet represents legislative authority; we represent executive authority. Their task is to draft laws and resolutions pertaining to problems of soldier-internationalists; ours is to implement them with the help of the mechanisms of government and power.

"It has turned out that the 'Afgantsy' [veterans of the Afghanistan war] look after about themselves. The state has no obligations with respect to them. It is as if the state was not the one which sent them to war and that it was not on behalf of the state that they killed there, and also died there, but, it also turns out, at their own whim.

"But this is not the case. The state sent us to Afghanistan and must bear responsibility for this. The state cannot get off with benefits and promises to really supply these benefits. There must be a thoroughly thought-out, purposeful state program for the social protection and adaptation of all veterans, not just Afghan veterans. I have in mind those who fought in Ethiopia, Angola, Egypt, Vietnam, Korea, China, and other countries. I also have in mind veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

"It is very distressing that a shadow of support for the GKChP [State Committee for the State of Emergency] has fallen over the veterans of war and labor committees. The veteran nomenklatura and the veterans themselves have quite different interests and views. They must not be confused and equated under any pretext. Therefore, we consider it vitally important for ourselves also to protect the interests of the veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

"We believe that the state should have its own program so as to be prepared should such military conflicts, God forbid, be repeated in the future. That is how it is in the United States, Great Britain, and other rule-of-law, civilized states."

Military Commission Orders Weapons Pullout From Azerbaijan

LD0710192791 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1800 GMT 7 Oct 91

[Text] Commanders of military units stationed in Azerbaijan received an order to withdraw urgently military equipment and weapons from the territory of the Republic, a source who wished to remain unidentified reported to the (TURAN) agency. The order comes from the Commission of the Transcaucasian Military District, which has arrived to carry out an inspection of weapons. Railway workers reported that in the last few days a withdrawal of tanks and other military equipment from the Republic is being observed. The Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Commission for Security and Military Issues suggested that an extraordinary session of the parliament should urgently declare all weapons and military equipment deployed here the property of the Azerbaijan Republic.

Estonian Defense Force Officers Form Own Union

PM2509085391 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 24 Sep 91 p 2

[TASS-INTERFAX report under "Information: Panorama of the Country" rubric: "Union of Estonian Officers"]

[Text] The founding meeting of the Union of Estonian Officers has been held in Tallinn. As Udo Helme, consultant of the Estonian Government's defense and border protection department, stated in an interview for BALTFAX, the creation of this union is dictated by the need to unite patriotically minded officers to create their own defense forces fundamentally distinct from Soviet ones. The union's tasks include patriotic defense work among the population and the organization of military festivals.

An equally important task of the new organization, in Helme's words, will be to ensure the social protection of the union's members because, under the Soviet law on pension provision, pensioners of the USSR Armed Forces living outside the country forfeit their pension.

Latvian Home Defense Guard Head on Organization Problems

LD1209211991 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0900 GMT 11 Sep 91

[Excerpts] [Announcer] This morning I invited to the microphone Girts Kristovskis, the acting chief of staff of the Home Defense Guard of Latvia and deputy of the Supreme Council. The most important subject of our conversation was, of course, the forming of the Home Defense Guard. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Kristovskis] The Home Defense Guard of the Republic of Latvia is a noble and good aim,

and I have also been given the task to organize this structure as quickly as possible, and to start its operations. But at the present moment we are again having difficulties with housing the headquarters. It was envisaged that today we could move into the premises of the Council of Trade Unions. We had an agreement, but the trade union leadership nevertheless in the end did not want us on their premises.

I can understand the Council of Trade Unions. I can also understand the fact that they do not want people in uniforms moving about in their premises, and we too are not actually interested in this. We must as soon as possible start work somewhere, in order that we might direct and normally organize work in the republic.

At the present moment this question remains open, and it must be hoped that it will be tackled correctly within the next few days.

Therefore, I have written a letter to Godmanis in the name of the headquarters, and I hope that today this question will be decided sufficiently rapidly. If not today then maybe tomorrow the Supreme Council Presidium will adopt a serious decision in this connection.

[Announcer] But is there at the present moment normal coordination with the republic's rayons?

[Kristovskis] There is no such coordination at present because we don't have (?independent) telephones. The persons who want to obtain firsthand information, who organize this work in the republic, telephone the Supreme Council and the Commission for Defense and Internal Affairs. You must understand that this is not normal coordination.

[Announcer] I understand that the Home Defense Guard also has problems in connection with the former Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy [DOSAAF] organizations.

[Kristovskis] Yes, a week ago the People's Front adopted a resolution that the property of the DOSAAF must be taken under the jurisdiction of the Home Defense Guard. It must be said that it still is not clear in what manner this must be taken over, and how much of the DOSAAF property the Home Defense Guard needs so that it would not be a burden but a structure necessary for us. Well, it must be said that in some talks with DOSAAF specialists, I have come to the conclusion that this matter could be solved in such a way that those types of sports which were under DOSAAF subordination might be transferred to corresponding federations, becoming independent sports federations which have their direct contacts with the corresponding sports federations of the world, but that part of the property which could be of use to the Home Defense Guard for training, for establishing, let us say, the sports clubs of the Home Defense Guard, this property should be at our disposal.

Last Monday, a conference of the DOSAAF of Latvia convened, which adopted new rules and changed the

name. This conference was not lawful. The changes were made in an attempt to preserve this bureaucratic structure, and did consider how much this bureaucratic structure—the old DOSAAF is under a new name—how much use this other unit would be to the Republic of Latvia. So this question remains open. In order that the property is not distributed far and wide, and that in the event of this question being solved we do not receive only empty premises or blank walls, this DOSAAF organization must without delay submit to the republic's government a list of all DOSAAF property. We could then come to an agreement with these sports federations what each should take, or search for some other way to solve and to interest people in the distribution of DOSAAF property.

[Announcer] This Saturday and Sunday in Jurmala, at a seminar organized by the People's Front of Latvia as it will be called, there will also be information on topically urgent Home Defense Guard questions.

[Kristovskis] Yes, on Saturday there will not only be information, there will also be, I think, many specific documents and confirmed projects. The most important document at the moment is the Home Defense Guard statute. It has now been drawn up, and I hope that tomorrow the Presidium of the Supreme Council will confirm this document, and will in fact clear up many of the points on the formation of the guard in the rayons, and when the Home Defense Guard (?battalions) have to be formed. [passage omitted]

Latvian Council To Monitor Soviet Military Installations

*LD0610035591 Riga Radio Riga International
in English 2130 GMT 3 Oct 91*

[Text] The Latvian Supreme Council today formed a parliamentary commission for the purpose of monitoring Soviet military installations on the territory of the Republic of Latvia. Two weeks ago, an agreement was signed between Soviet Defense Ministry and Latvian governmental officials in Moscow, allowing for Latvia to monitor Soviet installations. The agreement was reached in preparation for intergovernmental negotiations between the USSR and Latvia, which are to determine the terms and timetable for the withdrawal of the Soviet Army from Latvia.

DOSAAF Talks With Lithuanian Successor Group

*91SV0125B Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 38, Sep 91 (Signed to press 17 Sep 91)
p 5*

[Unattributed article: "DOSAAF Appoints an 'Ambassador']

[Text] In connection with the declaration of independence by the Lithuanian republic and its recognition by

the State Council of the USSR, activities of the republic's DOSAAF organization have ceased. In its place, from now on, are the organizations "Sports and Technology" and "Vityaz", and the Lithuanian aviation club.

Taking this specific case into consideration, the Presidium of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee has decided to establish contractual relations with these organizations, as well as with the enterprises of the former DOSAAF organization in the republic. These relations have to do with problems of developing and providing material-technical support for technical types of sports and sports that have military applications.

Major-General G. Taurinskas, member of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee Presidium, who until recently headed the DOSAAF Central Committee of Lithuania, has been appointed representative of the USSR DOSAAF Central Committee for preparing the appropriate agreements.

Lithuanian Home Defense Draft Expected in Oct-Nov

*OW2409152591 Moscow BALTFAX in English
1340 GMT 24 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuania's deputy prime minister Zigmas Vaisvila said in a televised interview he wishes that the first draft for service under the Home Defence Office will take place in October-November this year. According to Z. Vaisvila, this is connected with the fact that Soviet interior ministry troops will begin to leave Lithuania in the near future. It's common knowledge that these troops are used particularly for guarding prisons.

In this connection, the deputy premier pointed out, his government prepared to draft decrees: one on a draft for service under Lithuania's Home Defence Office, and the other on forming interior service units under the ministry of internal affairs. A major function of such service is to guard penitentiaries.

Lithuanian Security Department Director Appointed

*LD0610070191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English
0000 GMT 3 Oct 91*

[Text] By a special decree of the Lithuanian prime minister, Vice Premier Zigmas Vaisvila has been appointed director general of the Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania.

Ukrainian Defense Minister Interviewed

*91SV0125A Moscow SOVETSKIY PATRIOT
in Russian No 38, Sep 91 (Signed to press 17 Sep 91)
p 6*

[Interview with Major-General of Aviation Konstantin Petrovich Morozov, minister of defense of the Ukraine, by Georgiy Chernomorskiy, parliamentary correspondent of SOVETSKIY PATRIOT; place and date not

given: "The Motherland Will Not Let It Go Unrewarded: A Conversation With the Minister of Defense of the Ukraine." The first two paragraphs are introductory.]

[Text] Ask a professional military man to tell about himself and everything can be summarized in a few laconic phrases: "I was born, studied, and served, and again, studied, served...." This is why, during the interview with Major-General of Aviation Konstantin Morozov, minister of defense of the Ukraine, our parliamentary correspondent, Georgiy Chernomorskiy, "omitted" this question and instead made use of the general's dossier from our editorial office.

And now, Konstantin Morozov. He was born in 1944 in the city of Bryanka, Luganskiy Oblast [now: Voroshilovgradskiy Oblast], into a worker's family. His father was Russian; his mother Ukrainian. In 1967 he completed the Kharkov Higher Military Pilot School imeni Twice Hero of the Soviet Union Gritsevs. He became a pilot, a flight commander, and a squadron commander. In 1972 he entered the Military Air Academy imeni Gagarin, which he completed in 1975. He commanded an air regiment and a division. He flew the MiG-17, MiG-21, and MiG-23 fighter aircraft.... In 1982 he entered the General Staff Academy, which he completed two years later. His last position was commander of one of the air armies based in the Ukraine. On September 3rd, the Supreme Soviet of the republic was nearly unanimous in confirming Konstantin Petrovich Morozov as the minister of defense.

[Chernomorskiy] Konstantin Petrovich, the position of minister of defense today requires not only military professionalism, but purely diplomatic qualities as well. After all, in order to successfully resolve the tasks placed before you, you will have to have contacts with more than just troop commanders of military districts, the Black Sea Fleet and the border troops. Much will depend on how mutual relations with the ministries of defense of the USSR and the RSFSR develop, as well as with the leaders of oblast councils. Military commissariats have now been appended to the oblast councils. How do you see your new position?

[Morozov] I am proud of the high degree of confidence placed in me and I shall try to justify this confidence. There will be many difficulties. Unfortunately, I do not have any experience in diplomatic work, although I understand that the straightest path is not always the most reliable one or the shortest one. But I shall not be working in a vacuum, but as a member of the Cabinet of Ministers. I am also counting on help from the permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet. Furthermore, the position of minister presupposes the existence of a ministry. It is difficult for me to say today what its organizational structure and staff will be like. There is no doubt about one thing: There will be competent and honest people working there, and we shall try to focus their efforts toward one goal—the assurance of sovereignty for the Ukraine.

I can picture quite well how the national guard will be organized and how it will fulfill its tasks. But with regard to our own armed forces What will they be like? How long will it take to organize them?... I shall not be able to provide a comprehensive answer to these questions even a month from now, let alone on the first day of my "ministry." A great deal will depend on whether our republic will join the Union and what kind of Union it will be. We have to wait for the results of the referendum and for appropriate decisions from the legislators.

[Chernomorskiy] What are your ideas regarding the defense policy of an independent Ukraine?

[Morozov] The republic needs its own armed forces, organized on the principle of reasonable sufficiency, considering the geographic position of the Ukraine, as well as the military-political situation. The second aspect of the defense concept is that successful completion of strategic defense missions is possible only if there are unified strategic armed forces under one command. They would include aviation and missile formations equipped with nuclear weapons. I would hope that our parliamentarians will lay a specific legal foundation for this concept by way of a series of laws having to do with defense.

[Chernomorskiy] We have already talked about how military commissariats will be appended to the oblast Councils. Their leaders will probably have a difficult time of it. They are out-and-out civilians who have no experience.... Don't you think that under these circumstances it would be worth thinking about establishing a republic military commissariat?

[Morozov] This is a fair question. Actually, even in Tajikistan, where distances between some oblasts are several thousand kilometers, at one time a decision had been made to do just that. As a result, all work related to military call-ups in the republic is now well coordinated. Furthermore, we could do this without expanding our staffs.

[Chernomorskiy] Please explain how you would do this.

[Morozov] We have to improve the work of the commissariats to the extent that each oblast military commissariat could, without cutting out any of its work, delegate just one duty to the republic military commissariat. But I repeat, thus far we have not made any such decision. We have to weigh carefully all the "pros" and "cons."

[Chernomorskiy] Yesterday, when you were appointed, I happened to be a witness to a curious dialogue. Its essence was the following: If there is another attempt at a coup, how will the minister of defense protect us if he does not have a republic army? What can you say about this?

[Morozov] It is true that the Ukraine does not yet have its own army. But I discount a coup, notwithstanding all the predictions of Globa [identification unknown] and other prophets. The leadership of the armed forces is

now comprised of pro-democracy people with a heightened sense of civic duty. They see their main task as one of protecting the interests of the state and its people.

[Chernomorskiy] What is your attitude, let us say, toward attempts of not very competent people to blame the coup indiscriminately on all the Armed Forces? Even today, the flow of insults directed at the military has not diminished.

[Morozov] I categorically disagree with such accusations and, inasmuch as we really do have quite a few ignorant people, I would like to quote a few lines of the oath, the text of which was approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet: "...unquestioningly adhere to all military regulations and orders of commanders" and further, "...If I violate my solemn oath, then let the severe punishment of Soviet law fall upon me, as well as the general hatred and contempt of working people." Incidentally, the regulations that have also been approved by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet always have the underlying theme that a chief's orders constitute a subordinate's law. Law! So, do we have the right to defame servicemen for adhering to their oath and carrying out orders?

Remember the history of our Motherland. There were many successful and unsuccessful revolts. But not once did the plotters reveal their true goals. On the contrary, they always claimed that they were acting for the people and for the state. What then is the solution? I think that the lawyers have to put in their weighty words. Why couldn't we add to the regulations, as was the case before the war, that all orders have to be carried out, except those which are clearly criminal? It is true that the prewar regulations did not clarify what constitutes "clearly criminal orders." But we must do this now. We need a clearly defined legal status for servicemen.

[Chernomorskiy] What do the Supreme Soviet and the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine intend to do about strengthening social rights of the serviceman?

[Morozov] Troop commanders of military districts and the Black Sea Fleet, as well as the Chief of the General Staff of the USSR were invited to a recent meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the republic. Among the many issues discussed there, primary attention was devoted to providing housing to officers and warrant officers. Over 60,000 of them, stationed in the Ukraine, have no housing. And you have to take into account that the number of people needing this support will increase, due to the withdrawal of troops from Poland and the former GDR. There are, however, important reassuring factors as well. At one time, Leonid Makarovich Kravchuk, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine, was successful in obtaining a part of the funds which the government of Germany paid to the USSR as compensation for housing construction. These funds were sent directly to the Ukraine. As of now, several foreign firms are building a housing area in Krivoy Rog. If only we could learn to build that way! Good quality and

quickly.... In short, several thousand families will be assured of having fully furnished quarters, even this year.

[Chernomorskiy] Konstantin Petrovich, I have a very sensitive question. Will there be a Union and will there be an overall ministry of defense? I doubt that anyone can answer this question today. But on the other hand, everyone understands that the republic recently established its own ministry of defense and that it did not take this action just to disband it tomorrow. By virtue of the historical uniqueness of our people, military duty was always considered a matter of honor in the Ukraine. Today, practically every other officer and warrant officer in the Armed Forces is a Ukrainian by birth. It is no coincidence that there are hundreds of thousands of Armed Forces veterans in the republic today who receive pensions from the Ministry of Defense. Many of them are afraid that the infamous event will be repeated. After all, in the 1920's, it often happened that a veteran of the First World War would come to the social security office and be asked by a very "revolutionary" official: "For whom did you fight?" "For the tsar-father." "Well then, go ask him for a pension." Could you clarify this problem and calm the people's fears?

[Morozov] The Cabinet of Ministers is now looking at a whole range of issues tied to the social protection of servicemen, participants in the war, and veterans of the Armed Forces. The Fatherland will not allow service to go unrewarded. Justice will not be violated. People's interests will be protected.

Lvov Region Wants Nuclear Arms In Ukraine

*OW0709142891 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1325 GMT 7 Sep 91*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Chairman of the Lvov Regional Council of People's Deputies Vyacheslav Chernovil is firmly against the movement of nuclear weapons from the Ukraine. Speaking in Lvov on Saturday, he declared that he "would take every effort" to prevent Russia from carrying out this action.

Chernovil criticized Yeltsin's statement that all nuclear weapons could be moved to Russia. Yeltsin had spoken Friday at a TV link organized by U.S. TV companies.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Appeal to Troops

*91SV0117A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
5 Sep 91 p 1*

["Appeal of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet to Sailors and Soldiers, Junior and Senior Noncommissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, Officers, Generals, and Admirals of Military Units of the USSR Armed Forces Stationed in the Territory of the Ukraine and Beyond Its Borders"]

[Text] Dear Comrade Servicemen!

The Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], proceeding from the mortal danger which hangs over the Ukraine in connection with the state coup in the USSR 19 August 1991 and implementing the provisions of the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Ukraine, has proclaimed the Ukraine an independent democratic state on 24 August 1991.

The republic Supreme Soviet has adopted the Resolution "On Military Formations in the Ukraine," and has subordinated all military structures situated within republic borders to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. The decision has been made to establish the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense. The government of the Ukraine has been directed to initiate efforts to establish the Ukrainian Armed Forces, republic guard, and security unit of the Supreme Soviet, Cabinet of Ministers, and Ukrainian National Bank. None of this is aimed at lowering the combat readiness of troops.

The legislative acts adopted pursue a single humane goal—to prevent the use of troops against the people of the Ukraine and other sovereign states.

A working meeting took place in the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet with the troop commanders of the military districts and navy, and those of centrally subordinate military commands situated on Ukrainian territory. General of the Army V.N. Lobov, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, participated in this meeting. Agreement was reached to the effect that the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet Commission on Defense and State Security will develop, jointly with the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, specific proposals on the entire complex of military issues and will submit these for the examination of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

Appealing to you in such a difficult sociopolitical situation, we call upon you to continue to carry out your military service, to unswervingly maintain order and sound organization, strict compliance with regulations and military discipline, avoid unauthorized absence

from the location of your military units, and prevent any thoughtless, destabilizing actions. The Ukrainian leadership is undertaking practical measures to guarantee the legal rights and interests of all officers and servicemen. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has directed the Cabinet of Ministers and appropriate commissions of the Supreme Soviet to draw up a package of draft laws on military issues. Parallel efforts are underway to draw up draft laws on social and legal protection for servicemen and their families, regardless of ethnic affiliation. The material well-being of servicemen and members of their families will be protected by the Supreme Soviet and government of the Ukraine. We guarantee all the legal privileges, pensions, and allowances that have previously been enjoyed by military servicemen and members of their families.

The Supreme Soviet and government of the Ukraine guarantee observance of the rights of all servicemen and members of their families which are presently afforded by USSR legislation in the territory of the Ukraine, and will not permit restrictions of the legal rights of servicemen and members of their families, irrespective of ethnic affiliation, language, attitude toward religion, or political convictions.

We are counting on the mutual understanding and support of all military servicemen. We hope that the parents of soldiers and sailors, junior and senior non-commissioned officers on basic term of service will give their blessing to their sons to accomplish unswerving execution of their military obligation.

The Supreme Soviet and government of the Ukraine have considered and will continue to consider it their duty to assist in strengthening the defensive capability of the state and in ensuring utilization of the Armed Forces exclusively for defense, not for the resolution of internal political problems. We will do everything in our power to revive the prestige of the Army and establish normal conditions for military service.

The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

3 September 1991.

Decree on Armed Forces Leadership Changes

91UM0850A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Sep 91 First Edition p 1

[USSR president's ukase on higher officer staff appointments and dismissals followed by biographical data]

[Text] Ukase of the President of the USSR on Appointments to Posts and Dismissals From Posts of Officials of the Higher Officer Staff in the USSR Armed Forces[sub-head]

1. To appoint:

Colonel General Vladimir Magomedovich Semenov commander in chief of the Ground Forces-deputy minister of defense of the USSR;

Colonel General of Aviation Viktor Alekseyevich Prudnikov commander in chief of Air Defense Forces-deputy minister of defense of the USSR;

Colonel General of Aviation Petr Stepanovich Deynekin commander in chief of the Air Force-deputy minister of defense of the USSR.

2. To dismiss:

General of the Army Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov from the post of commander in chief of the Ground Forces-deputy minister of defense of the USSR;

General of the Army Ivan Moiseyevich Tretyak from the post of commander in chief of Air Defense Forces-deputy minister of defense of the USSR.

3. To appoint:

Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Podkolzin commander of airborne troops, having dismissed from that post Colonel General Pavel Sergeyevich Grachev.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow, Kremlin, 31 August 1991.

Colonel General Vladimir Magomedovich Semenov

He was born on 8 June 1940 in the village of Xhurzuk in Karachayevskiy Rayon of Karachayevo-Cherkesskaya Autonomous Oblast in Stavropol Kray.

In 1962 he graduated from the Baku Higher Combined Arms Service School.

He began his service in the forces in the post of commander of a motorized rifle platoon. Then he was commander of a company. In 1970 after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze he was appointed commander of a motorized rifle battalion and later chief of staff of a regiment. In 1973 he became commander of a regiment and then in 1975 chief of staff-deputy commander of a division. In 1979 he graduated with honors from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In 1979 he became commander of a division, in 1982 commander

of an army corps, in 1984 commander of an army, and in 1986 first deputy commander of the Transbaykal Military District.

In 1988 he was appointed commander of the Transbaykal Military District.

Colonel General of Aviation Viktor Alekseyevich Prudnikov

He was born 4 February 1939 in Rostov-na-Donu. In 1959 he graduated from the Armavir Air Forces Service School.

He began his service in the forces in the post of flight instructor of an aviation training regiment. In 1967 after graduating from the Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin he was appointed deputy commander of an aviation squadron.

In 1968 he became commander of an aviation squadron.

In 1970 he became deputy commander of an aviation fighter regiment for flight training.

A year later he was appointed commander of an aviation fighter regiment.

In 1973 he became deputy commander and in 1975 commander of an air defense division.

In 1978 he became first deputy commander of an air defense independent army.

In 1981 after graduating from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces he was appointed first deputy commander and in 1983 commander of an air defense independent army.

From 1989 to the present he has commanded the troops of the Moscow Air Defense District.

Colonel General of Aviation Petr Stepanovich Deynekin

He was born 14 December 1937 in the city of Morozovsk in Rostov Oblast.

In 1957 he graduated from the Balashov Air Forces Service School.

He began his service in the forces as a pilot and a commander of a long-range aviation aircraft. In 1969 after graduating from the Air Force Academy imeni Yu.A. Gagarin he commanded an aviation regiment and a division. In 1982 after graduation with a gold medal from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces he was appointed deputy commander of an air army. In 1988 he was appointed commander of long-range aviation and in 1990 first deputy commander in chief of the Air Force.

While he worked as a pilot he mastered several types of combat aircraft, including the TU-160 strategic aircraft, and he has logged 4,500 hours of flight time. He has been awarded the title of "Honored Military Pilot of the USSR."

Lieutenant General Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Podkolzin

He was born 18 April 1936 in the village of Lepsinsk in Andreyevskiy Rayon of Taldy-Kurgan Oblast.

In 1958 he graduated from airborne service school.

He began his service in the forces in the post of platoon commander. Then he was commander of an independent reconnaissance company of a guards airborne division and commander of a paratroop battalion. In 1973 after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze he was appointed commander of a guards paratroop regiment. In 1974 he became deputy commander and in 1976 commander of a guards airborne division.

In 1982 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In 1982 he became the first deputy chief of staff of airborne troops, and in 1986 chief of staff-first deputy commander of airborne troops.

Commanders of Military District Detailed

91SV0062A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Sep 91 First edition p 1

[Unattributed article: "New Appointments"]

[Text] There is a process of renewal of the command staff underway these days in the Army and the Navy. The editorial board has been receiving reports of more and more new appointments. Responding to numerous requests, we will immediately inform you, respected readers, about the most significant of them and publish short biographic data of those who are nominated to new posts. Today we present new commanding officers appointed by ukase of USSR President M.S. Gorbachev: Lieutenant General V. Toporov of the Moscow Military District, Lieutenant General V. Mironov of the Baltic Military District, and Lieutenant General A. Sergeyev of the Volga-Urals Military District.

Lieutenant General Vladimir Mikhaylovich Toporov

He was born 7 February 1946 in the city of Baranovichi. In 1968 he graduated from the Odessa Artillery Service School.

He began his service with the forces in the post of a platoon commander of an antitank battery and then commanded a battery in an airborne assault regiment.

In 1975 after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze he was appointed deputy commander of a regiment. In 1977 he became commander of a regiment. In 1979 he was deputy commander of a division. In 1984 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In 1984 he was made commander of a division. In 1987 he was appointed first deputy commander and then in 1988 commander of an army. In 1989 he became chief of staff-first deputy commander of the Far Eastern Military District.

Lieutenant General Valeriy Ivanovich Mironov

He was born 19 December 1943 in the city of Moscow. In 1965 he graduated from the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Service School imeni Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. He began his service with the forces in the post of platoon commander and then became commanding officer of a company. In 1973 after graduating from the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze he was appointed chief of staff-deputy commander of a regiment. In 1975 he became commander of a regiment, in 1977 deputy commander of a division, and in 1979 commander of a division. In 1979-1982 he took part in the effort to render international aid to the Republic of Afghanistan. In 1984 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. In 1984 he became first deputy commander of an army and in 1989 first deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District.

Lieutenant General Anatoliy Ipatovich Sergeyev

He was born to a working family on 6 November 1940 in the village of Ivanovka in Bolsherechenskiy Rayon of Omsk Oblast. In 1963 he graduated from the Far Eastern Tank Service School with honors.

He began his service with the forces in the post of commanding officer of a tank platoon. Then he became commander of a training company and deputy commander of a training tank battalion. In 1973 after graduating from the Military Academy of Armored Troops imeni Marshal of the Soviet Union R.Ya. Malinovsky he was appointed deputy commander of a regiment. In 1974 he became a commander of a regiment and in 1978 commander of a division. In 1982 he graduated from the Military Academy of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

In 1982 he became chief of staff-first deputy commander of an army and in 1986 commander of an army. In 1988 he became chief of staff-first deputy commander of the Odessa Military District. In 1983-1986 he served as part of a limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Problems of Officer Retirement System Examined

91SV0114A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel O. Falichev under the rubric "A View of the Problem": "Recommended for Discharge"]

[Text] Recently KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has several times addressed the topic of the discharge of officers and warrant officers in connection with the reduction in the USSR Armed Forces ("Discharge 'in an Amicable Way'"—7 July 1989; "I Appeal for Help"—5 January 1991; "Why the Lieutenants Are Leaving"—5 April 1991). But as letters from readers show, the problem is far from exhausted. And it is not just because a whole

package of laws on defense issues has still not been passed in our country, including laws governing the procedure for performing military service.

Readers' letters contain much unfavorable criticism, for example, about the time it takes to process "discharge" documents and the bureaucracy in examining issues associated with this. Familiarization with this problem at the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate led to interesting observations, seemingly typical for all branches of the USSR Armed Forces.

To be quite honest, I have had occasion more than once in the field to observe another officer, long awaiting a discharge into the reserve, waving his hands in annoyance: "Procrastinators..." He had in mind, of course, the higher levels of authority who slow the process and create red tape. The editorial board also receives quite a few complaints like this. Here is the latest. Officer S. Sushkov, a former military-political worker from Orenburg Oblast, writes: "Perhaps you know and will tell me why the process of discharging an officer from our Armed Forces is such a drawn out affair. One gets the impression that after the application is filled out, no one cares what happens to the officer. Why do the discharge documents, as in my case, take months? Is it really not possible to somehow speed up this process?"

There is no doubt that much in the question raised by Sushkov depends on the personnel directorates of the branches of services. Unjustified delays do occur. But it is indeed no simple matter now to discharge an officer into the reserve. Why?

As we know, an application for discharge goes through a complex chain of command: regiment—division—army—district—branch of service—Main Personnel Directorate... At each level, the corresponding chief may either sign it or return it for a number of reasons. If an officer is being discharged due to a staff reduction, it is also necessary to get the "okay" from the minister of defense. There are multiple stages here. Whether or not this is warranted is another matter. Haste in filling out documents can be a reason for their delay at various stages. Examples?

Lieutenant Colonel G. Popov, chief of an engineer service unit, was recommended for discharge into the reserve back in June, although he will not be 45 years old until October, that is, four months before reaching the age limit. Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Belyavskiy, an instructor in the military department at the Tajik Polytechnical Institute will not reach the age limit until December. The picture is roughly the same for Lieutenant Colonel A. Ukhov from the Blagoveshchensk Higher Tank Command School... Seemingly, of what importance is it that an officer is two to four months short of completing a specific term of service?

"The problem is, the law does not permit us to pass on their cases," says Lieutenant Colonel N. Timoshchuk, a senior officer at the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate. "That is, we do not have the legal right to do this.

You see, by law an officer in the rank of lieutenant colonel is discharged at age 45... Here the documents lie, waiting until the officers reach 'legal age.'"

Still, this is only one side of the coin. As it was explained to me, one must also consider another aspect. An officer discharged even one month before reaching the age limit loses part of his pension, is deprived of the right to wear the Veteran of the USSR Armed Forces medal, to wear the military uniform... In other words, it is a matter of giving back to a person in full that which is due him for his many years of conscientious service. So, judge for yourselves: Can the people observing the letter and spirit of the law and standing guard over the social interests of those being discharged into the reserve be called "bureaucrats?"

Personnel people are punctual and meticulous. But there are cases when documents are returned because basic legal norms have not been observed or requirements governing documents have been ignored. What requirements? Major A. Lipinskiy (Kiev Military District), chief of an armored service unit, was recommended for discharge into the reserve, and the documents were sent to Kiev. But everyone knows that cities such as Kiev, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and a number of others have a special residence permit. The Personnel Directorate of the Kiev Military District had to know this. The officer did not have the documents confirming his right to a residence permit. The documents had to be returned. What then? One month later, the documents arrived again: Belotserkovskiy OGVK [expansion unknown] had been typed in the place where the word Kiev had been. Did they assume that it would not be noticed, that it would be overlooked? But when things like this happen, the officer cannot avoid extra chores and unnecessary correspondence.

Other typical errors include things such as incorrect titles of the positions from which officers are being discharged, absence of data for awarding the Veteran of the USSR Armed Forces medal... You cannot get around these "small things." In such cases, it is necessary to query the personnel offices, send telegrams, and waste time.

Such is the "bureaucratic" aspect of the question in discharge cases. The discharge of young officers is more complicated. If those who have served 18-19 years strive to hold out until 20-25 years in order to receive a pension, the young officers, as they themselves write, have "nothing to lose." The rating of the Army and the officer profession has been declining swiftly in recent years. Back before the military-political bodies were abolished in the Ground Forces, about 6,000 officers knocked about because of the "establishment," those who, having served quite a few years, found themselves "in limbo": without any clear future in the service, without a position, and sometimes without housing. Now there are considerably more of these officers. I doubt whether you will find better "agitators" than they. Often some veteran tells a young lieutenant frankly:

"Sonny, what are you thinking about? Here I served faithfully and truthfully for more than 10 years, and now they are driving me out of the Army without housing..." (Alas, such cases do occur.)

All this prompts young people to submit their applications, and sometimes to commit rash acts. Other "refuseniks" seek a discharge from the Army by any means, including illegal means. Here are some figures. Since 1989, just in the Ground Forces about 7,000 (!) officers have been discharged for conduct unbecoming an officer and for incompatibility. Do we really have so many unworthy people in our Armed Forces? Not likely... There are also those who write to the United Nations or the President of the United States, and those who go on hunger strikes. Senior Lieutenant O. Stenin, a headquarters battery commander, engaged in...self-accusation. "I filled out all the discharge documents," he writes. "I interviewed myself, imposed punishment on myself, and wrote my performance reports by my own hand. Why? My commander said he could not bring himself to do this..."

That is right. Distressing, but this is true.

"Yes, we try somehow to retain young officers," agrees Colonel P. Zakhezin, deputy chief of the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate. "But under no circumstances can we place them under the article on conduct unbecoming and discharge them with a bad service record. That would only increase the number of people bringing to civilian life a negative attitude toward the Army..."

I cannot help but agree with this. Do we have to keep everyone and not release them, thereby increasing the number who have grown angry and despairing? Will an officer serve conscientiously under threat? Finally, can we trust such an officer to stand alert duty at a launcher or strategic missile with a nuclear warhead? As we can see, a mass of political, military, and moral questions arise. Until recently, they were not being resolved, but were driven to an impasse. Today we can see a light at the end of the tunnel. The chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, General of the Army V. Lobov, stated frankly in an interview: "Officers should have the legal right to interrupt their military service when they deem it necessary." Well, such a time apparently will come. Already officer cadets in their second year at a number of military schools are concluding contracts on terms of service in the Army. The package of laws on defense contains the possibility of discharging officers at their own desire after serving a corresponding number of years. Apparently, in time other movement is also possible in military legislation. But for the time being, drunks, violators of discipline, and loafers, paradoxical as it may be, stand a better chance of being discharged into the reserve at their own request than does a conscientious, industrious person who made a mistake in choosing the officer profession.

But why do commanders and personnel workers try somehow to keep young officers in the Army? (This is

seen not only in the Ground Forces, but also, I know, in the Air Defense Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, and other branches of the Armed Forces.) Above all, it is because the Army, despite the reduction in officer positions, sorely needs...officers, especially young officers. You see, the shortage in such officers in the primary positions in the Armed Forces today, according to data from the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, is about 13 percent. That is many thousands of people. Is it wise to squander that which is in such short supply?

Having discharged thousands of young officers in recent years, we have created a certain vacuum in the corresponding age groups, which, I have been told, will make itself known in the future. Therefore, on the one hand, you can understand the personnel organs. But the change in the situation in the country, military reform, and the reduction in the Armed Forces are radically changing the approach to this question. The attitude toward discharge cases is changing in that same Ground Forces Personnel Directorate. How? Recommendations for discharge are being examined just as closely, but there is a more real consideration of the coming changes and a sober assessment of the situation, I would say, in their evaluation and in the decision making. If you like, it is an understanding of that simple truth that it is no use trying to force them to stay. All the more so when they are uncovering violations, formalism, red tape, and sometimes the callousness of other local commanders come to light—then, without questions harsh decisions are made, up to and including a report to the commander in chief.

After lack of consideration for a long time, Senior Lieutenant I. Orlov (Transcaucasus Military District), a deputy company commander, finally was recommended for a higher position. But the officer turned it down, explaining that he was already 31 years old and that it was too late to make the service a career. What is more, after long deliberation he submitted his application for discharge. The division commander and army commander agreed with the arguments and signed the application. But for some reason the documents were returned from the district, and all of a sudden the officer was withdrawn to the staff. A short while later, he was recommended for discharge for...incompatibility. Is it not a paradox: First he was promoted to a higher position, and then they considered him incompatible even for the position he held.

Colonel A. Akulintsev, a senior officer of the Personnel Directorate, went to the unit. The facts were confirmed. As a result, Sr. Lt. Orlov was restored to his position, and the pay and allowances withheld were paid to him in full. In the report addressed to the chief of the Personnel Directorate, Col. Akulintsev emphasized that "the regiment commander, who treated the officer callously, was personally to blame for all the illegal actions." The conclusion was also radical: "It is advisable to discharge Sr. Lt. Orlov as a reduction in staff and to impose a punishment on regiment commander Colonel A. Guryev."

I saw the instructions of the acting commander in chief on the report: "Concur."

As far as Sr. Lt. Stenin is concerned, whom we have already talked about, the decision concerning him was as follows: The Ground Forces Personnel Directorate deems it advisable to discharge the officer into the reserve and proposes he be transferred to the Odessa Military District, considering his daughter's illness and the availability of an apartment in Tiraspol.

As we can see, no one in this organization intends to hold up personal cases. On the contrary, they thoroughly examine each of them, delve into its essence, and go to bat for those who have been deprived or offended... The prospects? In one of the offices I saw graphs and diagrams not only strikingly showing the dynamics of officer discharges in recent years, but also giving a view of the future. Unfortunately, the prognosis is not very comforting.

"We now have about 4,000 applications from young officers wishing to be discharged into the reserve," Lieutenant General V. Lelin, chief of the Ground Forces Personnel Directorate, stated frankly and with concern. "Nevertheless, we will not mince matters and will try to determine the fate of each lieutenant. One of the latest directives of the USSR minister of defense on personnel issues also requires this. People devoted to the Fatherland have always been highly valued and will always be needed."

Life will show how it will be in the future. One thing can be said with confidence: The changes in our society certainly will accelerate radical reform of the country's Armed Forces. And it is very important to do everything possible to see that these reforms lead to a qualitatively new condition for the troops and their combat readiness, and a renovation and uniting of our officer corps.

PRAVDA Calls for End to Army's Use in 'Internecine Warfare'

*PM0310104391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
28 Sep 91 Single Edition p 4*

["Our Commentary" by PRAVDA military observer Vasilii Izgarshev: "Should We Fear the Man With the Gun?"]

[Text] An old friend asked me yesterday:

"Has General Ivan Fuzhenko decided to pour gasoline on the streets of Dushanbe? And scatter powder around the city's squares?"

That was his comment on the statement issued by Colonel General I. Fuzhenko, commander of the Turkistan Military District, in connection with recent events in the Tajik capital. The commander said that the district's units will play no part in political confrontations or in conflicts within the sovereign republic.

Is that correct? I think that it is absolutely correct. Otherwise what have we learned from the sorry lessons of Dushanbe, Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, Stepanakert, Moscow in August, and other painful areas in our state?

Should our commanding officers do nothing but carry on sending more and more notifications of death to Russian soldiers' mothers in Ryazan, Tula, Tver, or Saratov? And should the "black tulips" [medical evacuation helicopters] with zinc coffins aboard carry on taking off into the troubled sky, as they did during the recent Afghan nightmare?

I think that it is time to stop driving our men in military uniform into the conflagration of internecine warfare provoked in one place then another by sinister ambitious political intriguers. We've had enough. Any disputes, even the most glaring disagreements, can be solved at the negotiating table. They will never be solved by bullets, grenades, or bayonets. They will only be driven within, like an evil scab, and sooner or later will cause a healthy organism to erupt.

I would like to hope that the initial experience of the talks between the leaders of the four sovereign republics that ended with the signing of the joint communique in Zheleznovodsk will inspire us with optimism. And if an abscess like that in Nagorno-Karabakh is eliminated as a result of the Russian and Kazakh presidents' goodwill mission, how relieved everyone will be and what hope there will be for those living both in that blazing region and in all the country's other hot spots.

...Shots have rung out in Tbilisi. Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, commander of the Transcaucasus Military District, has issued an official statement saying that the district's military subunits will not take part in the conflict and will not appear on the streets of Georgia's cities.

Well, does it look as though there is no need to fear the man with the gun any more?

I telephoned Army General V. Lobov, chief of the General Staff, and asked:

"Vladimir Nikolayevich, what comment would you make on the two military district commanders' decision?"

"I approve of it. It's the correct decision."

That evening I switched on the radio. The news carried an official statement by the chief of the General Staff saying that troops have been ordered not to interfere in any conflicts.

It was this military boss who, back in December 1986 when many unhappy residents of Alma-Ata appeared on the streets of the Kazakh capital, true to civic duty, displayed the will and courage not to allow troops to be involved in the conflict.

Yet Article 6 of the Fundamental Law was still in force then and, at a session of the republic Communist Party Central Committee Bureau that day, the most zealous leaders demanded that the troops be brought in immediately. Colonel General Vladimir Lobov, commander of the Central Asian Military District, then said resolutely: The Army will not under any circumstances be involved in a conflict with the people.

Our Army has different tasks. Its task is to defend the fatherland. If we are still sending men in uniform to harvest potatoes and cabbages and forcing them to build houses, work in the "chemical industry," and pave roads, that is due to the dire need and general lack of responsibility [beskhoznost] that have swept the country. Needless to say, it is unsuitable for soldiers to do these things, but it cannot be avoided. You can only reconcile yourself to it at the moment.

As for using soldiers against their own people, that is absurd! However, August in Moscow taught us all an objective lesson about this. We should not forget it.

What about the "gasoline" on the city streets? Who will protect the population against its flames? I think that there is a clear-cut remedy for this: Prevent confrontation. Don't excite human passions and don't, God forbid, arouse mob instincts. And if we are still unable to control our passions, then law-enforcement organs must be reinforced. Both the center (if it survives) and the republics should certainly have small, but technically equipped mobile forces to safeguard and maintain order.

We must rid our military once and for all of their role as "suppressor" of the people. And this must be ratified by acts of legislation.

**New Air Force Commander in Chief Deynekin
Interviewed**

*91SV0100A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 6 Sep 91 p 2*

[Interview with Aviation Colonel General Petr Stepanovich Deynekin, commander in chief of the Air Force, by N. Belan; place and date not given: "Gaining Altitude"]

[Text] One can hardly recognize the Armed Forces, as all of our society, since the bitterly memorable events of August. Fundamental changes have begun. I was involuntarily thinking about this at Kubinka Air Base as I talked with Aviation Colonel General P. Deynekin, the new commander in chief of the Air Force and Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR.

The guests of the garrison—military attaches and Soviet and foreign journalists—were shown aviation equipment both in the air and on the ground. I had seen this modern and not so long ago top-secret equipment before. It was something else that was unfamiliar: the mood, the ideas of people, sounded in concentrated form in the words of the commander in chief.

[Deynekin] The processes of departyization and depolitization of the Army that have begun actively reflect the now long defined position of most military fliers. The party political structures that existed interfered constantly and quite persistently in the resolution of virtually all practical issues of our combat training, vital activity and prospects, tying the hands of commanders and specialists. But they inflicted the greatest harm of all on personnel policy. An intelligent and highly rated pilot, for example, could be moving up in the service. His candidacy would be submitted by the formation commanders and considered by the military council of the formation and then of the Air Force, but the fate of the officer or general would be decided by the administrative bodies of the CPSU Central Committee. Some young man there in a gray suit and blue shirt would pick up the special telephone and say that this candidacy did not suit them. Yes, it may not have suited them, but after all it was we who had to forge combat readiness, to fly, to indoctrinate people.

[Belan] The elimination of the political organs will affect the fate of many of our political officers, among whom there are very many decent people and pilots.

[Deynekin] Yes, there are 8,500 political officers in the Air Force, most of whom are rated specialists, and many can fly. I would be so bold as to assure you that we will approach each of them individually, carefully, and attentively. We will rely on the decision of the certification commission and the opinion of the officers' assembly in determining their fate. Not a single communist—and there are 130,000 of them in the Air Force—will suffer either.

[Belan] So then, the situation today differs from that which existed during the cutbacks in the Armed Forces during the times of N.S. Khrushchev?

[Deynekin] Certainly, and fundamentally. We are doing a great deal of work today so as not to permit any injustice, as occurred when people were discharged without benefits literally a few months short of having earned their pensions, etc.

[Belan] Thank God. And are you a member of the CPSU yourself?

[Deynekin] I was a member from 1957 until August of this year. Then our former commander in chief, today the USSR Minister of Defense, was the first to leave, and I was next. We made our announcement at the officers' assembly of the Air Force High Command, and the people greeted it with tumultuous applause.

[Belan] And what were your motives for leaving?

[Deynekin] Being communists, we had tried for more than 30 years to fulfill our duty to serve the Fatherland with honor. Like all the rank and file communists we did not enjoy any benefits, Central Committee dachas, or health resorts; that was the right of the party apparatus, the elite. Our lot was just to fulfill our "instructions," that and pay our party dues. The events of recent years, even months, especially during the days of the coup, revealed a great deal. It was Yeltsin, who had left the party, and Rutskoy, who had been expelled from the CPSU, who stood in defense of democracy, and not the officials of the Central Committee, not the officials from Staraya Square.

[Belan] But after all, it was one of our, Air Force, party organizations that expelled Rutskoy from the party.

[Deynekin] The Air Force did not expel Rutskoy—the pilots' attitude toward Rutskoy was good and most respectful, he had served in Afghanistan in battles where, you may recall, he was shot down twice and was captured. Rutskoy was expelled, as one of the newspapers justly wrote, by 49 angry men, party bureaucrats, which aroused legitimate indignation among all honest fliers. As far as our attitude toward him goes, Rutskoy was appreciated even before the events of August, at the air show at Tushino.

[Belan] I know that social, domestic, and housing problems are very acute in the Air Force today. When and how is their solution foreseen?

[Deynekin] Yes, we have 40,000 families without apartments, including 6,000 families of pilots. The situation is being aggravated by the fact that the withdrawal of troops from Eastern Europe is underway, and an avalanche of 25,000 servicemen without apartments awaits us. We are thus eternally grateful to the president of the RSFSR; his recent directive to strengthen social protections for servicemen who are completing their service on the territory of Russia inspires hope. But we and ours can do a great deal for ourselves to earn money for social and

cultural purposes. We have a great deal of goods that are difficult to dispose of that we could sell to advantage, and we have begun to get engaged in commercial activity—I won't list it all. But almost all of the hard currency and rubles that we are earn today do not get to us. Give us 30, 40, or 50 percent of what we earn and we will use those funds to build housing, nurseries, and kindergartens. We will find people to build all of this for us.

We look to the future with optimism today. Aviation is spreading its wings and finally beginning to gain altitude to allow the fliers and designers to fully unleash their creative strengths and display talent and originality.

Problems With Aging Flight Trainer Noted

91SV0108A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
21 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major V. Malov, deputy commander of aviation engineering service squadron, Orenburg Higher Military Aviation Pilot School: "We Are Flying by the Seat of Our Pants." Article is under the rubric "A Problem Requiring a Decision."]

[Text] The scheduled flight operations shift began without delays. The first aircraft took off in strict accordance with the plan schedule, and soon there were only a few aircraft left at the central servicing point, scheduled to take off later. The lieutenants—last year's graduates—and their pilot instructors flew off to their maneuver zones and to their flight routes.

After some time had passed, the L-29 training aircraft already began taxiing back to the ramp. Reports from element chiefs of the technical maintenance unit began to come into the control point of the aviation engineering service where I was fulfilling the duties of senior flight engineer. The reports stated that the pilots had no negative comments about equipment performance during flight. But this did not last long. Two unsatisfactory marks, "ones," were posted right after the next flights had taken off. Altogether, five aircraft were just not able to take off during that flight shift. It goes without saying that the squadron aviation specialists did everything they could in order to make these aircraft operational. And already by the next day they participated in the flights again.

Even this time, however, the flight did not end without a breakdown. This again meant "overtime" for the technicians, a nerve-racking time, and a spoiled mood for the pilots.

It is probably difficult even to remember a flight operations shift during which, as they say, everything went without a hitch. "We fly by the seat of our pants," as our officers sometimes say ironically. They are the ones who have to prepare and fly these morally and physically obsolete aircraft into the air. These aircraft have served our military aviation well. Judge for yourselves.

The service records of some of the L-29's note the manufacturing date as 1964. There are 1966 and 1968 aircraft which have gone through several overhauls. They have reached the limit, as they say, even by amount of use. Meanwhile, these aircraft are being used for basic flight training by students who follow up with training on the Tu-184 and the UB-L.

Naturally, for us aviation specialists, under such conditions the first priority is the problem of ensuring flight safety and making certain that equipment works during flights. Frankly speaking, to resolve these problems is not simple, even though the squadron has a number of experienced officers and high class professionals who know this equipment thoroughly. Senior Lieutenants A. Kovalenko, O. Kalachev, Yu. Osipov, and others probably know all the secrets of their trade. Even they, however, sometimes fall into difficult-to-solve situations while organizing work for their subordinates.

The fact is that the L-29, manufactured at one time in Czechoslovakia, is catastrophically short of spare parts. I am not even speaking about pneumatic tires, of which we have only 40 for the 22 squadron aircraft during periods of intensive operational flights. We have already forgotten how we used to receive aircraft generators from a central distribution point, as well as other components and parts that are now in short supply. And what are we talking about? You cannot find the simplest 3.5 volt light bulb in the entire regiment in daylight and with a flashlight.

Of course, we regularly write requisitions for delivery of spare parts and expendable supplies, but just as regularly they are not filled. This is why we have to be technically sharp and resourceful, or simply said, we have to run around in order to maintain the squadron aircraft in operational and combat condition. Personnel of the technical- operational unit of the air regiment, who have large workloads, also have as many problems as we have.

I am convinced that similar difficulties are faced by all flying schools and DOSAAF organizations using the L-29. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a way out of this situation. Furthermore, pilots and aviation specialists believe that students should have a new aircraft for basic flight training. After all, the instructor staff also has to work under these most difficult conditions. This is especially true during the summer heat when the temperature in the cockpit goes above 50 degrees. The aircraft has no air conditioning, the so-called engine does not pull, and you can imagine the attitude of, say, senior flight instructor, Major Valeriy Sokolov, who has to "make" five zones with his subordinates on a complex flight during just one flight operations shift. Sometimes it hurts to look at our pilots, whose flight suits literally could be wrung out after a flight.

Of course, rumors have reached us about a task given now to the aviation industry to design a completely new domestically-made aircraft for students in basic flight training. This aircraft would be as simple to fly and

maintain as the L-29 was for many years, but would not have its shortcomings. No one could tell us exactly when it would make its appearance in the schools.

We also have a number of other problems on which flight safety depends. As the squadron engineer, I am seriously troubled by the situation which has developed with aircraft technicians. The problem is that these positions are staffed in training air regiments by warrant officers and extended service personnel. The latter come to us unwillingly. Low pay, no standardized working day, and difficulties with housing have clearly decreased the attraction of this profession for young men in Orenburg. Term enlistment soldiers, who completed the school for

junior aviation specialists, began to be assigned to us as technicians. For them it was going from bad to worse. Right now we have only two warrant officers who work as technicians; the rest are all term enlistment servicemen.

Officers of the Air Force Engineering Service see the solution to these problems in military reform. So far, unfortunately, all we have done is talk about it. Meanwhile, time does not stand still. After all, the personnel of our training air regiment are involved with ensuring the flight training of students—the future of military aviation.

Utility of Soviet Aircraft Carriers Questioned

91SV0055A Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 91
pp 19-21

[Article by Major Yu. Selivanov, political worker, under the rubric "Voices—The Military Reform: Problems and Opinions": "So, Does the USSR Need Aircraft Carriers?"]

[Text]

Opinion of a Concerned Reader

I read the article "An Illumination on the Screen and a Trail on the Ocean" (KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No 2, 1991) with interest. I would like to express a number of thoughts on the article. In the article a stone is cast in passing at N.S. Khrushchev for his rejection of aircraft carriers. For one thing, however, I do not believe that Khrushchev decided everything himself, particularly in such specific matters as naval development. In the second place, his opinion on the matter does not seem so odd to me personally. The following quote from his speech at a conference in 1957 shows that Khrushchev, a man with a practical mind, intuitively grasped the essence of the matter: "...the Americans build aircraft carriers because they have to conduct their affairs across an ocean."

One should also obviously bear in mind the big difference in the geostrategic situations of the Soviet Union, which lies at the center of the enormous Eurasian land mass, and that of the USA, a power separated from other highly important areas of the world by vast oceans. This difference had to have a very substantial influence upon the establishment of priorities in military development in these states. It was certainly no accident that our nation has given priority to ground armaments since ancient times, with a navy as an auxiliary asset, albeit an important one. America, on the other hand, always regarded the navy as just about the mainstay of its military might.

Indeed, what would the Americans have done in the Persian Gulf if they had not had aircraft carriers? It is my view that their operations in the Near East crisis fit into the so-called "naval-air operation" concept. It was advanced in the USA in 1984, along with the adoption of the "forward line strategy," also called "forward deployment strategy...."

And no matter how we view the U.S. participation in that and other, similar crises, we have to admit that America, with its super-expansive economy and whose well-being is directly dependent upon events in many areas of the planet, is simply fated to be permanently involved there. The USA imports around 40% of its oil, for example, most of it right from the Persian Gulf region.

Can that situation be compared with the Soviet Union's? There is practically not a single region outside our

borders upon which the Soviet State's survival is directly dependent. All the sources of our material existence are located within the state borders of the USSR, and aircraft carriers are certainly not what are needed most for protecting them. Indeed, just what role could such ships play in the defense, let us say, of the Trans-Siberian Railway or the Kuzbass coal basin?

Weapons, especially modern ones, are an extraordinarily expensive item. Aircraft carriers are especially costly, however, and this fact is stressed with complete justification in the article. Because of this incredibly high cost not a single nation, including the USA, can fully and simultaneously develop all types of weapons. They have to be selective and economize somewhere. By placing the emphasis on the development of naval and air forces, for example, the Americans are deliberately placing certain limitations on their ground forces, which presently consist of fewer than 30 divisions. The USA, to be sure, bears in mind that its European allies will more than compensate for the shortage in its ground forces.

And so, even super-rich America is forced to be selective. The Soviet Union even more so. Our financial possibilities are far more modest than those of the Americans, after all. In this situation only exceptional and extreme need could justify making ruinous expenditures on the aircraft-carrier program. Every ruble, and every billion all the more, spent on it is money taken away from the other branches of armed forces, primarily the ground forces, the traditional mainstay of our military might.

But can we afford such a luxury, particularly today, when we have to fight, so to speak, for every ruble in the military budget? Can we accept this at a time when a large-scale reorganization is underway in the army, when enormous numbers of personnel and combat equipment are being redeployed to the Soviet Union from the groups of forces abroad, when the configuration of the operational-strategic groupings is being altered? All of this takes money, money and more money, which is in disastrously short supply.

So just what are the imperatives forcing us to continue the construction of aircraft carriers? The need to show our flag in all the seas and oceans? We can clearly put this off until better times. An attempt to pressure the Americans and force them to sit down at the negotiating table on naval weapons? A senseless undertaking. This will only stimulate their programs for the construction of new combat ships. Perhaps purely military expediency? But wherein lies the expediency?

They say that a heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, as we call it, will provide air cover beyond the operating range of our coastal aircraft. One then has to ask whether it is so essential for our surface fleet to be beyond that range, 1,500 or 2,000 miles from our native shores. In the area of Naples or the straits of Denmark, let us say? How does this conform to our defensive military doctrine? Are such operations even possible in principle? After all, hard as we have tried, our fleet cannot compete with

NATO's combined fleets. This is an objective reality! So is it even worthwhile for us to fence off an "aircraft carrier garden"?

Past experience can serve as the criterion of the truth in many cases. It has shown that such land powers as Germany came out badly when they tried to match their forces with the traditional masters of the seas. Remember how the attempt by Hitler's surface fleet to establish dominance in the seas surrounding Europe ended. Relentlessly pounded by ships of the allies, Germany's limited number of battleships and heavy cruisers were forced to take shelter in their bases by 1942, where they remained, useless, to the end of the war.

Incidentally, the Germans also attempted to build aircraft carriers but changed their mind in good time about their priorities for naval development. They focused on the construction of a powerful submarine fleet, for example. And although the submarine was once called the weapon of the weak, in Germany's hands it turned out to be just about the most powerful trump in the war at sea.

We know that during the postwar period the Soviet Union placed its stakes on priority development for the navy's submarine forces. And the choice was highly successful, the West believes. In view of our limited capabilities and the need to choose priorities, it would be difficult to dispute the validity of such a decision today. In any case, when the decision was made as to what would receive priority—large surface ships or submarines—the latter absolutely had to be chosen. Time has confirmed the correctness of the decision. Reliance on a submarine fleet enabled the Soviet Union to monitor NATO's transatlantic communication lines adequately effectively and subsequently provided the basis for developing retaliatory nuclear-missile forces. I would say that we would have been unable to accomplish either mission by giving priority to the development of surface combat ships.

It is apparent, in view of our actual possibilities, that we made an extremely good choice in the '50s. All the more since it was supplemented with the simultaneous development of a broad spectrum of small surface combat ships, which provided optimal protection for the nation's coastal areas.

I am personally concerned that an increase in large combat ships, including aircraft carriers, could have an extremely negative effect upon our Navy's main component, the submarine fleet. And right now it is in need of major upgrading. I shall be so bold as to say that a considerable part of its forces afloat is fairly well worn out. If anyone disagrees with me, I would like to ask that person what is indicated by the increasing numbers of accidents recently. Western sources, among others, say that only 75 of 200 Soviet multimission submarines have operated less than 20 years. In this situation, in my view, enormous outlays on an aircraft-carrier program (if there

is one) could result in the loss of what we actually have today, with nothing to replace it.

I am absolutely convinced that the Soviet Union must under all circumstances be a mighty military power capable of opposing the United States if necessary. But this certainly does not require that we "mirror" its military and naval programs. We must assess our possibilities in the nation's present situation with extreme circumspection and sober-mindedness.

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Safety Measures on Nuclear Submarines Discussed

91SV0082A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
13 Sep 91, First Edition, p 2

[Article by Capt Lt A. Ivanov: "The Active Zone"]

[Text] When the navy began to build nuclear-powered submarines, the question of their salvaging seemed to be very remote. Solving it was practically put off for subsequent generations of naval personnel. Today, those who will have to be closely involved with this problem are now serving in the Navy (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has been writing about this for several years already). Our outside correspondent holds a conversation with Captain 1st Rank P. Smirnov, chief, nuclear submarine operations department, technical directorate, Pacific Fleet, about how this is being resolved at the present stage of mastery of nuclear submarine salvaging.

[Ivanov] Pavel Leonidovich, the salvaging of nuclear-powered submarines that have become obsolete is a process that has been little-developed in world practice. And many non-professionals consider it very dangerous. Is this the case?

[Smirnov] Everything associated with the creation, operation, and now also the salvaging of nuclear-powered submarines has always involved a great number of new and untested elements of human activity. But this in no way means that there must be unavoidable danger. On the whole, Navy specialists have acquired experience in "interacting" with atomic energy over the course of many decades, and today there are no "blank spots" in this procedure.

First, all of the processes associated with the salvaging and cutting up of nuclear-powered vessels, except for unloading fuel cores, are ordinary technological operations.

Second, fuel core unloading operations have already been worked out over the course of a quarter century, during which nuclear-powered vessels have existed, to the extent that it is simply incorrect to consider them something out of the ordinary. Apropos of this, the unloading of the nuclear cores from ships being salvaged has been developed especially, both organizationally and technically. The operational monitoring conducted by

the inspector from the USSR Ministry of Defense Nuclear Safety Inspection is stricter. From industry we have received the latest ship nuclear re-fueling apparatus, which has been designed taking into account everything that has been worked out over many years of practice.

Third, an environment which eliminates the possibility of a nuclear reaction under any positions of the reactivity compensation organs is created in the reactors of nuclear-powered submarines that have been written off. The danger of an explosion, and thus that radioactive products may escape, has been eliminated.

[Ivanov] How many Pacific Fleet nuclear-powered submarines are waiting to be cut up, and what are the immediate prospects of this work?

[Smirnov] There are 29 submarines. One ship has already been "converted" into metal scrap. The scrap has been given back to the civilian economy. Two other ships are in various stages of cutting up.

The rates at which the nuclear cores are being unloaded are increasing. From one in 1987, to four in the current year.

A set of technical measures is carried out on all of the written off ships, which ensure that they are viable and will not sink before the start of cutting up. Weapons, storage batteries, fuels and lubricants are unloaded. Special attention is paid to the reactor compartment. It is preserved in such a way that even if the ship turns over 180 degrees, or an aircraft falls on the reactor, nothing dangerous will occur.

Each year we will have an increase in the number of obsolete nuclear-powered ships. Unfortunately, the state turned out to be unprepared to solve this problem.

[Ivanov] Pavel Leonidovich, this is costly work. But, can the earnings from the metal at least cover it? To whom do they go?

[Smirnov] It is difficult for me to call the attitude at the departmental level, including our own department, toward the problem of salvaging anything other than a theater of the absurd. Judge for yourself.

We stockpile at the moorings of a submarine 58,000 tons of ferrous, and 50,000 tons of non-ferrous metal, which at world prices can be assessed at 18-35 million dollars.

In addition, there are the precious metals, as well as nuclear fuel "frozen" in the reactors which does not go for re-processing and repeated use.

Finally, there are more than 1,200 men, crew members in the ranks of from sailor to captain 1st rank, who are ensuring the safety of the nuclear-powered submarine's berth. The monetary wages of these people alone over the past five years have constituted 13.5 million rubles.

And another 35,000,000 kilowatts of electric power are consumed to support the berth.

Of course, it is not possible to avoid these costs completely. Even the salvaging of a passenger car is a rather costly matter. Nevertheless, the problems should not be worsened. It is necessary to act more energetically. Moreover, the navy is entering into the market with its price increases, and the more slowly it has done with its old warships, the more losses we will suffer. Expenses for the safe maintenance of written off nuclear-powered submarines will increase not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively. At the same time, we are at the present time already capable in the Pacific Fleet of cutting up four or five units per year. In five years this will make it possible to salvage up to 20-25 hulls. Approximately 40,000 tons of ferrous metal, worth approximately 5,000,000 dollars, and 35,000 tons of non-ferrous metal will enter the market. The non-ferrous metal is another approximately 10-24 million dollars, not counting income from the sale of attendant precious metals. And the expenses for maintaining the written off ships will be decreased.

What are the reasons for our slowness?

The problem was not calculated seriously enough from an economic standpoint. The enterprises engaged in cutting up the boats lack work incentive. Bureaucratic interests prevail here and fetter initiative. At times the leaders themselves do not understand the demands of time. Thus, the former director of one of the factories, V. Dolgov, stated that as long as he was in his position, he would have neither a cooperative, nor a lease hold enterprise involved in salvaging the nuclear-powered submarines. And, under the difficult conditions of conversion affecting the factory, this would provide employment for the enterprises and good proceeds, including currency proceeds, for the factory and state.

Comrade V. Murko, a responsible official in the apparatus of the Ministry of the Ship Building Industry, repeats Dolgov virtually word for word, thus expressing the position of the higher-ranking department.

[Ivanov] It is not for nothing that they say that no one is a prophet in his own homeland. And how are the Americans, say, doing at solving this problem?

[Smirnov] I do not have any information on how this problem is being solved abroad. However, such information would be very very useful for the specialist.

I will say more. To place a curtain of secrecy over this question is not only absurd, but also immoral. Technical, ecological, social and other problems of the practical implementation of the global problem of disarmament are closely intertwined.

As one of the way of continuing the East-West dialogue, it is now already necessary to examine the path of international meetings of specialists, including of military specialists engaged in the salvaging of weapons and

arms. Thus, only a mass attack by the intellectual and scientific and technical potential of all states is able to contend with the problem, with which, sooner or later, all of mankind will be confronted.

[Ivanov] What technical and technological difficulties are entailed in the salvaging of written off nuclear-powered submarines?

[Smirnov] Personally, I do not see any problems, at least problems of a technical nature. I believe that any ship repair factory that has adequate ship lift resources can accomplish cutting up a submarine and cutting out its power compartment.

What is complicated here is something else. That is the burying of the reactor compartments. It is safer, from all standpoints, to preserve blocks and compartments that have been cut off, than to preserve entire ships. From the moment that the "Pacific Ocean" burial ground is placed in operation we will have something to put in it. And there would be time to seek new and more effective solutions.

Further, the fact that there is no source of financing is also a complicating factor. There is no state program for the salvaging of weapons and military equipment; therefore, there is also no money. But, you will agree that the salvaging of chemical weapons and nuclear sources is a task of paramount importance. For the consequences may be global in nature.

The chains of departmental prohibitory norms, rules and instructions are yet another complicating factor. A five-year plan of inactivity, a five-year plan of prohibition, is the way I would characterize the past years, viewing them through the prism of this urgent topic.

And finally, having stockpiled mountains of equipment that is already needed by no one, we do not know how to approach it. Who today can propose anything to us for cutting hulls, other than the ancient oxygen torches? And these are tremendous expenses with minimal labor productivity. The boats being removed from the navy will arrive unceasingly. It is not possible to slow or stop this movement, and it is not possible to brush it aside. And the earlier not emergency, but long-term decisions are made, the more safe we all will feel.

[Ivanov] Having in mind technical, economic and ecological problems, are we forgetting about the historical problem? Are we cutting out, along with the ships, the history of the creation of the country's nuclear submarine fleet?

[Smirnov] Yes, the history of the development and establishment of our nuclear fleet is multi-faceted and instructive. It would be an unforgivable error to scrap it along with the war ships. For me, preserving the history of the nuclear fleet is preserving the prestige of naval service and naval traditions.

In the near future, for example, the cutting up of the first nuclear submarine built directly in the Pacific Fleet will

begin. Why don't we lay it up permanently at the Vladivostok Ship's Wharf, along with the legendary S-56? Let us make it a museum of the nuclear fleet, and gather veterans who raised it from the cradle?

I think this question deserves the closest attention, technically this honorable task is entirely feasible.

Inefficient Use of Hospital Ship for Profit

91SV0102A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with personnel of the hospital ship Svir by correspondent Captain First Rank P. Ishchenko; place and date not given: "The Svir Needs a Dock: Why a Unique Hospital Ship That Could Be Earning Money for the Fleet Is Being Used Ineffectively"]

[Text] Though I have long observed the Svir hospital ship off one of the docks of Severomorsk, its snow-white hull with large red crosses on the sides contrasting sharply with the lead-colored waters of Kola Bay and the same colors of the warships, only recently did I go aboard the floating hospital. The occasion was the Svir's participation in the international operation "Dervish-91" in late August. But my conversations with members of the ship's crew and with the medics about preparations for the event invariably turned to completely different problems—problems having to do with the way the Svir is used. The most characteristic comments of various officials are reproduced in this article.

S. Aleksyuk, chief mate on the hospital ship Svir:

Our ship was built by Poland and cost the state tens of millions of rubles. One would think that it should be used as effectively as possible in the interests of fleet combat readiness and medical support. But in actual practice, however, this year we have never been to areas where naval ships were engaged in operational missions. On the other hand, our ship, which is relatively comfortable compared to warships, is rather often used to accommodate all manner of commissions and inspectors visiting the fleet. It would be o.k. if this happened only at our permanent stationing site—although a hospital ship is hardly intended for such uses—but we're also sent to other garrisons. And essentially for one purpose—to take aboard and provide accommodations for such-and-such a number of people. In the past few months, our ship has been tasked with such a "crucial" mission three times. The first time, a whole 12 people stayed on the ship. Or consider the last time, when we were sent to a submarine crew garrison to take on the members of yet another commission. As it turned out, all the officers on the commission stayed with acquaintances on shore, and just one person stayed with us for three days. Since I was standing in for the ship's captain, I had to issue a report about that incident.

Medical Service Lieutenant Colonel G. Chistyakov, deputy chief of the hospital:

In the two years that the Svir has been part of the fleet, we have operated as a hospital for only a few months. Based in Severomorsk, we have been used to provide accommodations during this time for student teachers from the General Staff Academy, delegates to various conferences, and members of various commissions. And here's the result: Equipment and gear intended for preventive health care is wearing out and falling into disrepair, while our nurses and medical assistants have to perform such uncharacteristic work as serving as orderlies and cleaning cabins.

Among other things, the lack of proper work is leading to a situation in which the medical personnel of the Svir's hospital are being detached to other units. As a result, the officer-physicians are losing the professional skills that a hospital specialist needs.

Sometimes the situation is downright paradoxical. Even though the ship is being turned into a floating hotel, the hospital personnel are suddenly being required to maintain the same kind of service organization as on a warship. For example, a few months ago, Captain First Rank P. Khomenko, chief of the auxiliary fleet directorate, ordered the introduction of three-shift duty on the part of the hospital personnel. But the reason for a three-shift watch on a ship is so that the one-third of the crew remaining aboard can take the ship out to sea and accomplish an assigned mission. The specific character of our hospital is such that in light of its relatively small number of personnel, the medical specialists cannot fully replace one another. So what reason is there for medical specialists to stay aboard the ship around the clock?

Captain First Rank P. Khomenko, chief of the auxiliary fleet directorate:

I, too, believe that the hospital ship Svir is not being used in a sufficiently effective fashion. But our directorate is responsible only for ensuring the ship's preparedness, with supplying it with all types of provisions, making repairs, and practicing course and other missions. But determining how specifically to use the ship is the prerogative of superior staffs and the navy medical service.

As for my order introducing three-shift duty for the Svir's hospital personnel, I was acting on the basis of the relevant article of the Navy Regulations, which prescribes that no more than two-thirds of a ship's crew can go ashore. In addition, this measure will make it possible to improve the organization of hospital service, since the state of that service, as an inspection showed, leaves something to be desired.

Medical Service Major General V. Stroganov, chief of the Northern Fleet Medical Service:

To use a medical facility such as the hospital ship Svir as a hotel is blasphemy. Unfortunately, the opinion of the fleet medical service, which has opposed this practice, has not been fully taken into consideration.

It must be said that hospital ships of the subclass to which the Svir belongs were originally intended for use in peacetime to provide rest and relaxation for ship crews between cruises directly in the areas in which they are performing operational service. And a hospital ship with a large preventive health-care facility should be at sea for up to half of year. Other fleets have used similar ships—true, they were placed in service considerably earlier—in roughly the same way. But when the Northern Fleet got the Svir, the intensity of operational service had already begun to decline, and the concept per se of using hospital ships as preventive health-care facilities was shown not to have been sufficiently thought through. To this day there is no clear-cut "ideology" for using the Svir. Despite the fact that there is work for it to do—and serious work. Originally, the ship was to be stationed not at Severomorsk but at Murmansk. We expected it to take on a considerable part of the work load of the relatively small-capacity garrison polyclinic located there. The Svir's doctors could see patients from the support ship crews and from the crews of ships undergoing repairs. But no dock where the vessel could be moored was found at Murmansk. That's why it has to be kept at Severomorsk, where it lacks steady work.

Correspondent:

Four opinions, and they all concur that the hospital ship Svir is being used ineffectively and is not recouping outlays for its construction (it seems the time has come to pose the question of naval ships performing auxiliary functions in precisely these terms). The simplest thing would seem to be to do with our hospital ships what certain foreign navies do: mothball them in peacetime. But that decision would hardly be optimal. For example, American ships of this kind have much greater storage capacity and are intended solely for transporting wounded and sick; they do not have preventive health-care facilities. And moth balling them is completely justified. But the Svir and other ships of this subclass can be used in peacetime to greater advantage. One option has been proposed by the chief of the Northern Fleet Medical Service. I also heard other proposals, such as leasing the ship so that it can be used to provide rest and medical treatment to passengers on ocean cruises, or using it to provide medical support to the crews of fishing vessels in fishing areas. Implementing any of these proposals would be preferable to the current situation, if only for the reason that the floating hospital's medics would no longer be losing their skills, and the ship would earn money—maybe even foreign currency, a possibility that cannot be ruled out.

The problems facing the hospital ship Svir are not exhausted by those recounted here. Among other things, the medics feel that the existing statute on hospital ships should be supplemented with a section spelling out the relationship between the floating hospital's personnel and the ship's crew, and that the personnel should have the same level of social and consumer-service support as warship crews. The interests of the fleet also require that all these questions be resolved as quickly as possible.

Combat Readiness Problems of Missile Battalions Assessed

91SV0093A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lieutenant Colonel O. Bedula: "Some Go to the Training Area, Some...to the Vegetable Garden: Combat Readiness—Facets of the Problem"]

[Text] The air defense missile battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V. Orlov has made annual trips to the firing range over the past five years. And it has not received any grade other than excellent. The best battalion in the brigade, this unit was afforded the exclusive right to fire more often than the rest. This would seem to be cause only for joy. But there is something else to consider. Could it be that Orlov's men are perfecting their mastery at others' expense? Otherwise, how can one explain the fact that the battalion of Major A. Safiullin for several years now has only dreamed about the firing range. Major A. Strogan's unit is in the same situation. "It is disappointing, of course," states Safiullin. "People get out of practice. Without combat firing it is difficult for specialists to maintain their high level of training. And it is difficult psychologically as well..." Safiullin himself has been away from the training area for more than four years. The last time deputy launch battery commander Captain V. Verbichenko fired was in 1986. Senior Lieutenants A. Sedov and R. Agliullin, and Lieutenant I. Garkov have never smelled gunpowder over their period of officer service. Why does the unit find itself in such an unusual situation? "For a year and a half we have not had any acquisition radar," Safiullin states. We had no cable equipment. The fact that the command post was not at full officer strength also had its effect... "But here is the main reason pointed out by the many specialists I had occasion to speak with—once a difference in the training level of battalions began to show, the major command was forced to give preference to the best when selecting candidates for trips to conduct live fire. This is precisely what happened when the air defense commander in chief scheduled firing. Realizing the criticality of the situation, the major unit commander at that time, Major General A. Krotov, insisted that Orlov's battalion go to the firing range although another unit had originally been planned to go. But even the commander on whom all the attention is focused has significant reason for discontent. "The main 'training' sphere for commanders of my rank is ever increasingly becoming kitchen and other housekeeping functions," Orlov complains. An unpaved area around the barracks perimeter or poorly painted hatch covers on the sewage wells will cancel out every effort accomplished for the sake of combat readiness." And these are not just idle words. At one firing exercise the battalion was able to destroy not only its own targets, but those of its neighbors as well. Such was the state of affairs. Following this result, which missile specialists called fantastic, the senior commander wanted to present Orlov an award. "He does not merit it," decided Major General Krotov after some reflection.

"He has tall weeds growing out behind his barracks." The missile firing expert spends more than half his work time mowing down weeds and doing other agriculture-oriented jobs. And I must admit—I was not overjoyed at the professional livestock-breeding expertise shown by Orlov as he spoke about the daily weight gains of pigs, summer milk yields of cows, the drying and piling of hay in burning hot weather, the preparation of mixed fodders. Like other units, this battalion has its own kitchen facilities. The commander has a plan for selling meat. And another plan for scrap metal, although it is hard to understand how 12 tons of it are to be found in this swamp where the "post" has been located some 30 years now. Major Safiullin has bartered away 10 kilograms of meat in return for two truck loads of gravel to fill the road to the "post." Otherwise, the complex would not be able to relocate, if necessary, during times when the roads are bad. He pays in buckwheat for parts for a dilapidated tractor; otherwise, in winter the firing positions would be covered up with snow drifts. And like everyone else, he needs piping, paint, metal, and construction materials—it is all military commanders can do to keep track of where and in exchange for what all of this can be traded. Local authorities sometimes take pity and contribute something, sending paint or an excavator for a day or two of use. "Post" problems remain unresolved partly because of a lack of money and suitable engineering equipment. But one also hears another argument—Rust and people like him won't fly in here. Is this not why it has become almost fundamental for the major unit commanders, who replace one another every one-and-a-half or two years, to avoid incidents, to make a visiting inspection team happy by exhibiting exemplary order and excellence in the unit's agricultural endeavors? And it is not the fault of responsible officials but rather their awful plight that these indices have become the decisive factor in evaluating duty performance in an "interior" unit. As far as combat capability is concerned, there is always one model battalion used for demonstration. It is used to make judgments about all the rest. Nonetheless, the emphasis on housekeeping has not deprived the officers of their striving to enhance combat readiness. They proposed the introduction of substantive changes to the battalion's organizational structure—instituting the post of deputy commander for rear services as an essential position, while painlessly eliminating the organizational "slot" of launch battery deputy commander. The position of topographical survey crew chief requires a warrant officer—not a sergeant, as is presently the case. A soldier on his basic term of service will not be able to master the complicated equipment. Operational use of the powerful MAZ-547 has shown that soldier-drivers cannot provide high-quality servicing of this equipment. Conclusion: As is the case with the Strategic Rocket Forces, a warrant officer must be in the driver's seat of these vehicles. And, finally, it is time to settle the question of the pig-tenders, stokers, bread man, and dog breeder. The individuals

filling all these positions—not stipulated in the organizational tables—are diesel engine personnel... It is necessary to differentiate personnel by categories of "combatant" and "rear services personnel" so that each individual engages in his own business. Accomplishing this will not require an increase in the numerical organizational strength of the battalion—reorganization will free up the necessary number of warrant officers and soldiers. The creative accomplishments of officers with respect to developing and perfecting the training process have more than once traversed the path from battalion to

brigade, from brigade—to higher echelon unit, and from there—to major command. The ultimate status of the collective ideas and proposals is uncertain, insofar as appropriate feedback does not exist. It is clear, however, that following proposed changes, the combat unit will finally get the opportunity to engage in its main mission—training, exercises, firing. Reserves tied up in everyday concerns will be set free. And clearly, levels of unit readiness will even out. This means there will be no need for "elite" battalions to be running out to the firing range by themselves.

Shaposhnikov on Army Reform, Defense Budget

92UM0002A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 38, Sep 91 p 2

[Interview with USSR Minister of Defense Ye. Shaposhnikov, by B. Moseychuk; place and date not given: "Ye. Shaposhnikov: 'We Are Shedding Excess Weight'"]

[Text] Over a period of many years, the relationship between ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and the USSR Ministry of Defense had been cool, to put it mildly. We think that the reason for this was a particular dislike of our publication on the part of former Minister Yazov. At the same time, according to the latest sociological data, 43.5 percent of military personnel put ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in the most popular category. Thus, the steady stream of letters from them to us regarding the widest variety of problems of military life. The revealed negative facts, certain alarming tendencies, constructive thoughts, and practical proposals aimed at improving the Army—all of these have been perishing without a trace while going through military channels. The questions we asked at the readers' prompting often turned out to be rhetorical—they elicited no answers. The new USSR Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Air Force Ye. Shaposhnikov, has immediately broken a bad tradition: "I am ready to regularly answer the most topical questions through ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. The reform of the Army is impossible without respect for its basis: a man, an individual, a citizen in a military uniform."

We offer you the first interview—based on the questions asked by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY readers—with USSR Minister of Defense Ye. Shaposhnikov.

[Moseychuk] Yevgeniy Ivanovich, are you aware that the military procuracy, former political organs, and commanding officers not only are not capable of stopping the wave of violence, torment, and suicide in the Army, which are the result of "dedovshchina" [mistreatment and abuse of recruits], "clans," accidents and catastrophes with arms and equipment, but very often themselves contribute to it? Do you know which districts are hazardous to one's life?

[Shaposhnikov] There are no military districts, fleets, or services where tragedies do not happen. A greater number take place in the Turkestan, Far Eastern, and Moscow Districts. More than one-quarter of the casualties fall in the first six months of service. We have no intention to putting up with this any longer. The transition to an 18-month term of service for draftees, the introduction of alternative service, and stricter health criteria used by draft commissions are real steps toward preventing such tragedies. And something else: We need to bring back a principle that has, unfortunately, been forgotten: Each man in the military service answers in full for his actions, and only in person.

[Moseychuk] Many of our readers who had been considered participants of the Great Patriotic War since 1945, since 1988 are no longer considered such. Not too many

of them will celebrate the 50th anniversary of the victory. Will they finally receive what is due them?

[Shaposhnikov] There is indeed such an issue. We are still looking into it. I am certain that a fair solution will be found.

[Moseychuk] You say that an officer is a key figure in the Army, but there are now some officers who are forced to stay in the service. For instance, according to our information, since June the Northern Fleet has suspended voluntary discharges due to staff cuts, and officers are offered dishonorable discharges. What kind of input can be expected from a man who is serving a sentence in the Army?

[Shaposhnikov] None. Therefore denial of such a discharge is illegal. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the reluctance of officers to serve in the Army is the result of those phenomena which we will make an effort to root out in the nearest future. It is no secret that for many young and highly skilled officers service promotion is blocked by people who are at an age when they have long deserved the right to rest. Their retirement in strict accordance with the law—I have already given such order—open prospects for growth for the entire service career "chain." In addition, new documents recently adopted by the USSR State Council, upon our presentation, provide officers with real social guarantees: salary, housing, legal protection. Incentives to continue in the service will be provided by real salary increases, exemption from income tax, and removal of moral shackles.

It is another matter when we talk about graduates of military schools. The draft law on the status of the military envisages a mandatory minimum term of service, in proportion to expenditures on education.

[Moseychuk] Since we are talking about cuts, how do you feel about the fact that, in 1991 there were 1991 generals in the Army?

[Shaposhnikov] That would not be too bad, were it true. In reality, it turns out there are one-third more than that. Among them are hundreds who have served too long. Of course, we are not going to fire all of them. I think that about 15 to 20 percent will remain in the service: They are scientists, doctors of science, high-class specialists, whose knowledge and experience we need. I am against a brain drain from the Army. We will get things in order in this respect by the beginning of 1992.

[Moseychuk] In your television speech you called on those who found themselves out of business as a result of the departyization of the Army, to remain calm. How many such people are there, and what awaits them? Will there not be just a change of signs, as has happened many times before?

[Shaposhnikov] The departyization and the liquidation of military-political structures that are taking place in the Army are interconnected but not identical phenomena. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of people will be freed.

Some will retire, of course; some will go through certification commissions and officer assemblies, where people know very well who is who. Then we will help some to find jobs outside of the Army, while we will ask people with good skills to stay in the organs of combat preparedness and military and moral-psychological upbringing that are being created now.

This is only one direction of the radical military reform. It will encompass all aspects of defense construction and envisages a fundamental transformation of the Armed Forces. In particular, the Ministry of Defense, in my opinion, should become a civilian agency. Its structure will include committees: military; defense policy; procurement of armaments, military technology, and NIOKR [Scientific Research, Design, and Testing Work]; social and legal protection; manning and personnel; military infrastructure; and others.

[Moseychuk] What are your proposals for the military budget?

[Shaposhnikov] There is a common impression that if it were not for the military-industrial complex, we were not spending money on defense, we would live well. We would have everything. Let me clarify this. In 1990 the proportional share of defense expenditures in our country comprised seven percent of the gross national product. This is not a small sum, of course, but it is comparable with practically all developed countries. And for our Army it is too little. It is another matter how the military budget is spent. In the developed countries of the world, more than half of the total appropriations for military needs is spent on maintenance of the army and 20 to 25 percent on weapons procurement; in our country, these expenditures comprise 30 and 45 percent, respectively. Expenditures on the third sector, research and design, do not meet the needs, either. Think of the Stealth, the high-precision weapon our adversaries have, and I will not have to convince you that we are behind. To implement the planned reforms, to provide a decent material life for officers and to introduce the practice of mixed manning of the troops (draftees and volunteers on a contract basis) until we accomplish the transition to a completely professional army will require tens of billions. Ask for it? We will not get it. There is no place to take it from. We will look for reserves by redistributing existing resources. For instance, shift from the appropriations for arms and military technology procurement into maintenance of the Armed Forces. But, on the whole, the budget should be left alone. Reduction of expenditures on defense may lead to a loss of military-strategic balance.

[Moseychuk] Each subscription campaign has been accompanied by directives down the chain: Who should read what. Yazov's favorite publications were LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, DEN, and the magazine NASH SOVREMENNİK, subscription to which he made mandatory. What will be your directives in this respect?

[Shaposhnikov] There will be none. Let everyone read what he wants.

Restructured Army Should Center on Russia

91UM0854A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 29 Aug 91 p 1

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "A New Formula for Military-Economic Union: '14 plus 1,' with Unity Lying in Russia"]

[Text] It became apparent in the last days of August that the USSR no longer exists. There were suspicions in this regard in the past, but everything actually fell apart after the failed coup attempt. It became clear that the Novo-Ogarevo process was dead. This was the intent of the GKChP [expansion unknown]; it must be admitted that the plotters' goals had to a great extent been attained.

Incidentally, the Novo-Ogarevo agreements were flawed from the very beginning; they would not otherwise have fallen apart so quickly. Most importantly, they did nothing to effect a meeting of the minds on problems of common defense. Now, when the previous union—the center of which was the CPSU Central Committee apparatus located on Staraya Square—is in a state of decay and there is no sign of a new one, the Army remains as the sole structure that has not been seriously affected by the collapse. To whom it will be subordinated and how it will react in certain situations will in the final analysis determine the fate of that which is still called the USSR. There still exists a "common economic entity," in addition to the integral Armed Forces, but economic want, in spite of the potential importance of the problem, emerges as less of a misfortune in comparison with a tank division or airborne division that is dissatisfied with something.

That is why everyone is interested in the fate of the Army, particularly in who may wind up with mass destruction weapons. On 26 August, Vice President A. V. Rutskoy spoke confidently of the need for Russia's participation, along with the central structures, in the control of nuclear weapons. On the same day, RSFSR Presidential Press Secretary Pavel Voshchanov, speaking on the authority of Yeltsin, stated that in the event of secession of the former union republics, Russia would be disinclined to consider the present republic boundaries, which are rather artificial, to be final. Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev, also speaking on the same day, told journalists that any changes made in borders may lead to wars between the republics.

Meanwhile, there are no wars in the offing. There actually is no one to fight. The Army certainly did not fall apart as a result of the August events; it has retained its combat and command and control capabilities. All kinds of national guards are being organized in the republics, but the units are less than combat ready and could hardly be expected to compete in the near future with one of the world's most powerful armies. Nonetheless, the Soviet Army could disintegrate immediately

after the demise of the state that created it. The new Army leadership sees the need for urgency in carrying out reforms that would assist the Soviet Armed Forces to adapt to the new conditions of existence. However, even a highly significant reform implemented in an optimum manner may do nothing more than put off inevitable disintegration after a period of transition. While a state would find it difficult to exist without an army, an army without a state would amount to a lifeless cabinet fantasy.

Seventy percent of the Soviet Armed Forces are presently stationed within the boundaries of the RSFSR, with control centered on Moscow; everyone sees the need for non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thus, there is ample reason to assume that the present Army could easily make the change from a union to a Russian army in the event the new "independent" republics are unable to act quickly to achieve an effective military union obligatory for all.

At the same time, the "common economic entity" does exist, and there is no reason to assume that it would disappear with fractionalization of the USSR. However, a common economy presupposes a common defense, and, in any case, Russia's state interests will remain beyond her present boundaries, with continuing interest especially in the Russian-speaking populace that will undoubtedly remain in other lands, even if Russia's present boundaries will move considerably outward.

It is obvious that the sole guarantee of stability can be a military-economic union of the former union republics with Russia, not with some mythical Center. This kind of accord will set a definite limit on independence of the republics, but the overwhelming Russian influence would have definite limits imposed, especially in the military area. And—most important—officers and generals of the present Soviet Armed Forces will have fairly serious opportunities to continue to enjoy their professional careers, with no more feelings of being orphans in their own country. This would remove serious prerequisites for a new military take-over.

Summary of Military Help With Harvest

PM0310154791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 1 Oct 91 Single Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Summary of Operations"—All figures as published]

[Text] We hereby publish a summary of operations on progress in gathering the harvest as of 30 September obtained from the USSR Ministry of Defense Motor Transport Battalion Leadership Headquarters.

A total of 80 motor transport battalions were involved in the work (40,000 vehicles).

RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]—68 battalions (34,000 vehicles).

Kazakhstan—12 battalions (6,000 vehicles).

The total volume of agricultural freight transported reads as follows: 13.8 million tonnes, including 4.705 million tonnes of grain.

RSFSR—12.599 million tonnes, including 4.079 million tonnes of grain.

Kazakhstan—1.271 million tonnes, including 626,000 tonnes of grain.

The number of vehicles standing idle totaled 6,294. These included 4,594 vehicles in the RSFSR, and 1,700 vehicles in Kazakhstan.

SSN Eng Akulov's Service Described

91UM0844A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Aug 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Rear Admiral S. Yefremov (Ret.): "Engineer Officer Boris Akulov: The First Engineer Officer Aboard the First Nuclear-Powered Submarine"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Today, it is no secret at all that our country's first nuclear-powered submarine was built in the 1950s and put into service by the USSR Navy in 1959. This outstanding event was not given coverage in the open press at that time. There were few even in the fleets having any knowledge of this matter.

In connection with the 40th anniversary of adoption of Navy patronage by the VLKSM [All-Union Komsomol], in 1962 the firstling of the nuclear-powered fleet was named the "Leninskiy Komsomol." Bearing that name, she in time gained a fair amount of fame. The latter increased in the last few years as a result of a number of articles published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Readers were informed that her first commanding officer was now-retired Hero of the Soviet Union Rear Admiral L. Osipenko. Detailed information concerning the cruises under ice in the North Pole and sea trials conducted by the "Leninskiy Komsomol" in that area in 1962 became a public knowledge. The newspaper printed information on Hero of Soviet Labor Captain Engineer 1st Rank V. Peregudov, the chief designer of the first Soviet nuclear-powered vessel. In this regard, it is regrettable that the press has not provided an appreciable amount of information on military engineer officers who bore the major responsibility for implementing the then new nuclear propulsion system. I would like to fill this gap, even partially, with information that I have available.

There is a first in everything. That is life. The first person appointed to serve as engineer officer of the engineering department (BCh-5) aboard the first nuclear-powered submarine, in 1954, was Captain-Lieutenant Engineer Boris Petrovich Akulov.

Boris graduated from secondary school in the late 1930s. That was a time when youths were highly enthusiastic about studying for military service. Large numbers of them had a burning desire to attend military schools; Boris Akulov was no exception. In 1940, he was admitted into the Leningrad Special Naval School No 2. This kind of school was established by decree passed by the USSR Council of People's Commissars on 22 July 1940. With the fascist German invasion of the Soviet Union, Boris along with the other special school students were sent to erect defenses near Leningrad. The 16- and 17-year olds were then evacuated from Leningrad. Later came further study in the Gorky Special Naval Middle School. In 1942, Boris was sent to take a preparatory course of the Naval Administrative School. Later, in 1943, he was transferred to study in the Diesel Department of the Higher Naval Engineering Order of Lenin School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy.

It was the fall of 1948. Akulov wore the shoulder boards of an officer. After graduation from the school, it happened that the engineer lieutenant saw duty aboard a submarine first in the Baltic, then in the Black Sea. His first duty as an officer was as BCh-5 officer aboard diesel-powered submarine "M-239." The future nuclear propulsion specialist in the first few years of service as an officer exhibited high qualities as an organizer and submarine engineer officer. The following comments were written into an efficiency report in November of 1949 by the "M-230's" commanding officer, Captain-Lieutenant V. Skosarenko: "... Comrade Akulov... exhibiting remarkable capacity for work and industry ... was able to learn all the workings of the submarine in a minimum period of time and render his personnel a team ... " B. Akulov had also proved himself to be an industrious and capable person in his Black Sea service, during which he was appointed BCh-5 officer of medium submarine "S-69." His efficiency report (1953) included the comments: "works hard to master new equipment ... possesses good organizational abilities ... honorable, sincere, modest ... "

In 1954, personnel offices were required to nominate a candidate for engineer officer to serve aboard the first nuclear-powered submarine. Several candidates were on the list. Akulov was selected. Time later showed that no mistake was made in this regard.

At that time, the first nuclear-powered submarine and her nuclear power plant existed only on paper and in the minds of prominent scientists, designers and planners. Industry was still in the initial stages of creating new technical equipment and building the submarine. However, even then informed people were aware of the fact that there would soon be a need for qualified specialists who would be able to learn the ins and outs of nuclear reactors and their associated equipment for submarines.

A specialized personnel training program was set up, to be supervised by Academician A. P. Aleksandrov. The companies of future nuclear submarines learned the fundamentals of nuclear physics, construction of the reactor and of the entire system. Anatoliy Petrovich himself delivered a series of lectures. The effort began with training a group that included officers who would serve aboard the first two nuclear submarines. Theoretical instruction alternated with practice using dry land versions of the nuclear reactor.

As the students progressed in their familiarity with the design documentation and acquiring a knowledge of nuclear power technology, they became virtual participants in the creation of the new submarines. They submitted their suggestions and what they would like to see incorporated. The complement officers participated in the work of a so-called mockup commission, which worked on suggestions regarding optimum layout of components of the power plant and other equipment aboard ship. The personnel fabricated a mockup of a

control panel and determined the optimum arrangement of panel elements. The suggestions were incorporated into the design of the ships.

All the above was fascinating to Boris Petrovich Akulov. He exhibited great enthusiasm and dedication in discovering the secrets of nuclear physics; he studied the construction of the nuclear power plant and instructions governing its use. In 1956, Akulov completed the course of instruction with distinction.

He lost no time setting to work at the shipyard where the craft was being built. He got to know the shipyard specialists and the representatives of research and design organizations. He had his hands in all aspects. The following is the way Akulov was described in 1957 by submarine commanding officer L. Osipenko: "... possesses a high order of organizational skills ... approaches the resolution of all problems with assurance and knowledge, representing the Navy's interests in his work with industry representatives. Possesses a good knowledge of the ship; has ready answers to both technical problems and those associated with duty organization, combat training, and ship operation ..."

The engineering department is the largest aboard ship. That is understandable. The variety, complexity and peculiarities of the new equipment made it necessary to include in the ship's T/O&E a substantial number of specialists possessing a higher engineering education. The department acquired a good group of engineer officers. Now something about the group's makeup. The most immediate assistants to the BCh-5 officer are commanders of divisions. Incidentally, the subdividing of the engineering department into divisions was something new for submarines. Serving as the engines officer was Captain-Lieutenant V. Rudakov. The electrical division officer was Senior Lieutenant Engineer V. Luchinkov. The damage-control division was headed by Captain-Lieutenant R. Timofeyev. Also instituted were the positions of officers in charge of the various groups (remote control, automation, turbine, and others). These positions were filled by younger officers: Senior Lieutenant Engineers L. Romanenko, V. Mamlov, V. Ivanov; Lieutenant Engineers Yu. Balenko, Yu. Mikhaylov, A. Kryuchkov, A. Gur'yakov, I. Parovichnikov, and others. Although each one merits a great deal of discussion, let us stick to our story about the senior member of this collective: Akulov.

Boris Petrovich encouraged his subordinates to attain complete mastery of instructions pertaining to equipment installation and adjustment. He made certain that his subordinates worked in productive contact with shipyard specialists and participated directly in equipment acceptance. His work was guided by maintaining a close tie to the acceptance office of the Main Shipbuilding Directorate of the Navy. As recently related by the former senior military representative for nuclear power plants at the shipyard, Captain 1st Rank (Ret.) N. Lazarev, between the latter and Akulov there was a productive tie. They worked together to resolve any

problems that would arise. Their work was never without close interrelationship and mutual support.

The fall of 1957 saw the undertaking of a significant operation: loading the shipboard reactors with nuclear fuel. This was the first time that this kind of operation was performed in the history of Soviet shipbuilding. It was personally supervised by Academician Aleksandrov. It required two days: the 13th and 14th of September. That was when the reactors were made to go critical. This meant that a nuclear reaction was brought about and controlled in the reactors. That time may be considered to be the beginning of operation of nuclear reactors aboard Soviet Navy warships.

A period of intensity was initiated with the start of dockside tests. They took place over a period of several months, ending in June of 1958. Akulov would discover poor design solutions and poor work on the part of the shipyard, which prompted him to offer his suggestions. This kind of activity assisted in rapid and reliable elimination of defects. Boris Petrovich, with his knowledge and skill in handling difficult problems and his understanding of processes occurring in the operation of technical equipment, acquired a remarkable degree of authority not only with respect to the submarine personnel, but also among the builders, specialists, and industry. His opinion influenced chief submarine designer V. Peregodov, senior builder N. Dovgan, and other prominent specialists and production organizers. As the work progressed, leaders from a number of branches of industry and the Navy, especially B. Butom, the then minister of shipbuilding, made frequent visits to the shipyard.

Early in the month of July of 1958, the nuclear-powered submarine set out for her first sea trials. This cruise made an indelible impression on the participants. Boris Petrovich would later relate how a comradely "Hooray!" sounded throughout the ship when the craft submerged and the nuclear power plant started to propel the ship. In March of 1959, the commander in chief of the Navy issued the order to place the first nuclear-powered cruising submarine in the service of the Navy. After design review of mechanisms and other work was completed, it remained to carry out further operational testing of the warship as a part of the Northern Fleet. For his successful accomplishment of a government task, Boris Petrovich Akulov was awarded the Order of Lenin. Other company members were also honored with high awards.

After the craft was accepted by the Navy, Boris Petrovich, acknowledged as a capable and highly trained specialist, was appointed flag engineer submarine officer, for the first nuclear-powered submarine was soon followed by a second, then a third. The pace of nuclear fleet construction was quickening. However, everything exacts a price. The large workload, mental and physical stresses apparently took their toll. In 1960, Boris Petrovich was pronounced unfit for sea duty. Cardio-vascular illness compelled him to transfer to a shore assignment.

Of interest is Boris Petrovich's subsequent service. The central directorates of the Navy vied with each other to win the assignment of this specialist who possessed deep theoretical knowledge and extensive practical experience in learning to manage nuclear power as it pertained to submarines. The Navy Technical Directorate won out.

The end of 1960 saw him appointed Operation Department deputy chief in the Tekhupr [Technical Directorate]. As of 14 August 1962, B. Akulov became chief of the Submarine Department. His circle of activity was growing, with ever greater responsibility. The department dealt with the study and resolution of major problems related to ship operation, especially the military aspects of cruises. The major burden of cruises fell to the engineering departments of ships and technical agencies of the Navy and center. The area of activity of the Navy Tekhupr included the development of procedures for the use of technical equipment; safety in handling of technical equipment; equipment use rates; introduction of ship operation norms; and a great deal of other items, with the Tekhupr's role increasing substantially at that time. The Tekhupr attracted quite a number of officers who had served aboard the first nuclear-powered submarines. Also there were some of those who had served aboard the "Leninskiy Komsomol": L. Romanenko, V. Rudakov.

Completely natural and logical was the renaming of Tekhupr as the Navy Main Technical Directorate (1969). Akulov was placed in charge of ship operation and repair, as deputy chief of Navy GTU [Main Technical Directorate]. While not forgetting about nuclear-powered submarines, of course, he oversaw operations of all Navy ships. He became highly involved in the workings of the engineering departments of ships, assisting in

the work of deputy force commanders for engineering. In 1971, he was promoted to the rank of rear admiral.

I had the opportunity of serving with Boris Petrovich in the Navy Main Technical Directorate in the 1970s and to the end of his life. Boris Petrovich valued having good relations with all fellow servicemen. That however did not render him compliant or hesitant to speak out. On the contrary, he did not abandon his principles or steadfastness under any circumstances.

The man possessed all the attributes required for continual growth in service. However, his health became increasingly poor. His fellow servicemen would often notice how he struggled with ailments and attempted to rise above illness. He was advised to take care of himself, to seek rest, go on a cure. His typical response would be to laugh it off. As soon as he would feel better, he would again take up work, resolving the endless series of problems. For his health he had little concern. In 1981 he underwent very complex vascular system surgery of many hours duration. I visited him soon after the operation. In good spirits and feeling better, he spoke of the future. As I was leaving his hospital room, it did not occur to me that I would never visit and speak with him again.

There have been cases in the history of the Russian Navy whereby combatant ships were named after meritorious and valorous engineer officers. The Navy received many years of service from ships the likes of "Engineer Officer Dmitriyev," "Engineer Officer Zveryev," "Engineer Officer Anastasov." It would be altogether fitting and proper to name a Navy combatant or auxiliary ship after the first engineer officer of a BCh-5 who served aboard the firstling of our nuclear-powered fleet. His name is famous: Boris Akulov.

Political Workers Continue Training in Polish Army

91SV0113A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Petrukhin and Lieutenant Colonel A. Bugay: "The Structures Are New, but the Tasks... Former Political Officers Continue To Indoctrinate the Servicemen Among the Polish Troops"]

[Text] The military-political officers have been abolished in the Soviet Armed Forces. Who will replace them and whether they will be replaced at all is not yet known. But something else is clear—the process of professional emergence of the soldier should be buttressed by the process of military indoctrination. And here, it seems, one cannot neglect the experience of the armies of the former Warsaw Pact that took the path of democratic renewal before we did.

Reform among the Polish troops is in its third year. It was stripped of its communist ideology over a short interval of time as the result of depoliticization. The de-ideologization of the Army has led to a ban on the activity of political parties and groups among the troops. The multistaged system of political organs has been abolished.

A department of indoctrination subordinate to the vice minister of national defense for issues of indoctrination, B. Komorovskiy, was created in its place in the spring of 1990. Its principal tasks were defined as the civil-political indoctrination of the servicemen, propagation of historical traditions, reinforcement of discipline, law and order, the maintenance of army ties with society and a rise in the prestige of military service. The department's functions also include preparing and realizing indoctrination and training programs and planning, organizing and holding cultural and educational functions with the personnel, as well as concern for the social and living conditions of the servicemen. The appropriate structure of the department was created to resolve these tasks, and it differs markedly from the former main political directorate. The departments of civil and patriotic indoctrination, education and culture became the leading ones. Civilian specialists—psychologists, pedagogues, sociologists and art critics—predominate in them.

The military districts also have departments of indoctrination, the larger formations have divisions and the units have sections. The post of indoctrination officer, subordinate to the commander and the senior officer of the regimental indoctrination section, is envisaged at the battalion level. The indoctrination officers—most of whom are former political officers—plan and hold classes on civil and patriotic training, as well as providing consultation on indoctrination work. Eight hours a month are allotted for the classes, broken down into two hours a week on any day of the week at the discretion of the subunit commander. One hour a week is also envisaged for information and indoctrination work. The

subunit commander also determines its topic. It includes meetings with interesting people, debates and the viewing of films. There are no evaluations of the civil and patriotic indoctrination.

Two hours of classes a month on civil and patriotic indoctrination within the framework of command training is envisaged for cadre military personnel.

How does the current indoctrination service essentially differ from the political organs? The chief of the indoctrination department of the Polish troops, Brigadier General K. Ovcharek, recently answered this question in principle for a correspondent of the GAZETA WYBORCHAY.

Discussing on the departyization in the Armed Forces, he stated that "I know from my own experience that the party was a kind of trade union within the Army: One could even criticize one's own superior officer at meetings. The party in the troops was an officers' organization. It also engaged in ideological work, of course. Possibly that is why it was so easy for the Army to take the decision to remove the party. We did not suffer any tragedy. This was connected with the fact that intrinsically ideological work had occupied less and less of a place in the activity of the political officers. They devoted the greater portion of their time to the very same tasks as today. Where someone used to be secretary of the party organization, there are no grounds to accuse him of anything today. He was endowed with the trust of his colleagues." General Ovcharek sees a fundamental difference in the activity of the political officers and today's indoctrination service only in the fact that "the organs subordinate to it do not intend to impress some particular ideology upon the soldier." "We want," he said, "the sole ideology for everyone—from the general to the private—to be service to the motherland and faithfulness to it and the government of the country."

Overall, the chief of the indoctrination department feels, the service subordinate to him is occupied with the same problems as the former political organs. And chief among them, as before, is the notorious "hazing." "I myself did not sleep at night," recalls K. Ovcharek, "so as to instill order in the subunit. And if the actions of my colleagues did not conclude successfully, that was often only because the political officers did not have enough authority. They were not, contrary to widespread opinion, omnipotent."

Numbers of Military Specialists in Cuba Clarified

91SV0091A Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Sep 91 p 1

[Article by V. Badurkin: "USSR General Staff Issues Clarification"]

[Text] "Known for its adherence to the communist hard line, the Cuban Government, which is already experiencing difficulties due to the cutbacks in oil deliveries from the Soviet Union, received another blow when

Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin said that he favors a phased withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from the island.

"The U.S. State Department experts maintain that the Soviet military personnel on Cuba includes 1,200 military advisers, a combat brigade of 2,600 military servicemen, and about 2,000 technicians in Lourdes—an important Soviet listening post near Havana, from where they monitor U.S. communications.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Colonel General Ye. Smirnov, USSR Armed Forces General Staff department chief, told our correspondent that THE WASHINGTON POST information is close to the truth only in regard to the numeric strength of the Soviet training brigade stationed on Cuba. As to military advisers, none are on the island at this point; also, there are only 80 technicians. About a half of them work on a contract with the Cuban side and the rest are there under the provisions of gratuitous military aid. The latter will return to the Motherland soon.

By the way, America's Guantanamo Base (located in the southeastern part of the island with territory of 117 square kilometers) has two air fields, a Navy base, Marines, and radio and technical reconnaissance installations. Base personnel includes 200 officers, about 3,000 sergeants and privates, and 700 civilian specialists.

U.S. Troops Transfer to Gulf Viewed

PM2609110191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 21 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Lieutenant Colonel R. Mustafin report under the "Last Minute Item" rubric: "Storm Clouds Gather Once Again Over the Persian Gulf"]

[Text] A report received over the teletype forced us to discard certain items which were all ready and waiting on the type page: The 82d Paratroop Division, stationed in North Carolina, is in a state of enhanced combat readiness... The Pentagon is ready to activate at any minute a plan for military operations against Iraq under the code name "Determined Resolve." In addition to the 34,000 American servicemen who are still in the Persian Gulf region, further US Air Force subunits are being sent there...

In my view, the reason for such rapid and, frankly, unexpected military preparations by the United States is the U.S. Administration's desire to force Iraqi Leader S. Husayn to comply with the demands of the relevant UN Resolutions. It goes without saying that Iraq, or rather Saddam, has "gotten to" the Americans—and others too—by trying to avoid unconditionally fulfilling the compulsory UN Security Council Resolutions, once again confirming his reputation as a crafty dictator who is infringing international law and trying at all costs to preserve the nuclear cudgel upon which, judging from news agency reports, he is continuing to work. U.S. President G. Bush declared that the "last straw" in the

Baghdad ruler's schemes was the obstruction of efforts to organize international inspections at approximately 45 military installations where experts believe S. Husayn is concealing components for nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

I think we are still a long way from imminent war. Reports indicate that the Pentagon intends to transfer warplanes to the Gulf region merely to escort helicopters carrying UN inspectors during flights over Iraq. That aside, it can be supposed that the White House hopes that by flexing its muscles it can persuade Saddam to go back on his word. So far, President Bush has not set a final deadline for Iraq to comply with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.

Everything seems logical, at least at first glance. Nevertheless, such a development of events cannot but cause concern. Once again storm clouds are gathering over a region which is still feeling the effects of the recent lightning and devastating war. The reasons for the situation are understandable, and there is no doubt who is the "organizer of the party." But I am convinced that there remains one fairly significant circumstance: Did the international community give the United States the right to act on its behalf, or did Washington believe that honor as victor in the war against Iraq gave it an unlimited carte blanche with regard to Baghdad? That is fine, if all this ends well. But what if American pilots defending the lives of UN inspectors have to go into battle against the Iraqis, and what if S. Husayn follows the only logic he knows? It is no secret that the road to hell is paved with good intentions...

Commentary Views Lessons of Gulf War

LD2809030191 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service
in English 2000 GMT 27 Sep 91

[Commentary by Boris Belitskiy; from the "Vantage Point" program]

[Text] Although the latest flare-up of tension in the Persian Gulf now appears to be subsiding, it did serve to refocus the attention of the world on that region and rekindle memories of Operation Desert Storm early this year. This has added relevance to the lessons of that war which Boris Belitskiy speaks about in "Vantage Point" today.

There are many such lessons in the view of Soviet analysts. The most important is probably the conclusion that the ending of the cold war in Europe and the normalization of Soviet-American relations have not automatically put an end to tensions in the rest of the world. In fact, the Gulf War showed up the danger to peace inherent in the ambitions of regional powers such as Iraq to dominate their neighbours and to achieve supremacy in this or that part of the world. Such dangers, moreover, are not confined to that particular region, since conflicts of this type can destabilize the world economy and affect the global balance of strength.

The Gulf War and the latest flare-up of tension in that region have also highlighted the danger that would threaten the world should weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, or biological—fall into the hands of such local aggressors. Although at the same time the Gulf War illustrated, too, the enormous damage that can be done by the latest types of conventional arms.

Desert Storm also swept away quite a few illusions, such as the belief that the new political thinking can assure world peace without the establishment of a truly global system of comprehensive security. Unfortunately, such a system is not yet in place. Only the first steps have been taken to build it up. And this has so far yielded results only in Europe.

This is, in fact, the number one problem in the world today. In the view of one analyst, Dr. (?Sergey Rogov) of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies in Moscow. What is needed, he believes, is a mechanism for assuring an orderly transition from a bipolar world structure to a pluralistic system of international relations based on the interdependence and balance of interests of all parties.

This is essential to facilitate the necessary changes without upsetting military stability. The new mechanism must achieve three objectives: Coordinate the security interests of the Soviet Union and the United States; assure security at the regional level; and guarantee global security.

In short, it's important in the view of Soviet analysts that the Gulf War and its continuing repercussions should not bring to a halt the changes for the better in the world political arena. This, in turn, requires that the reduction of tensions be extended to other parts of the world—to the Middle and Far East, to Southern Africa and Central America.

All this, it is now clear, is fully in the interests of the Soviet Union and should have its full backing. This country, we now realize clearly, cannot afford the luxury of self-isolation from the rest of the world. On the contrary, it must work for integration into the world economy and for mutually beneficial links with East and West, North and South.

US Nuclear-Missile Strike Warning System Reviewed

91SV0050A Moscow *TEKHNICA I VOORUZHENIYE*
in Russian No 2, Feb 91 (Signed to press 26 Feb 91)
pp 38-39

[Article by Captain A. Chashchin: "In Foreign Armies: Nuclear-Missile Strike Warning System"]

[Text] In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the US placed into operation a nuclear-missile attack warning system called upon to accomplish such tasks as identifying the launch sites of the enemy's strategic missiles and the types and numbers of missiles launched; predicting the

spatial-time characteristics of a nuclear-missile strike by the enemy; and providing warning information about strikes.

The warning system is a complex data-processing system made up of several subsystems. The first subsystem is the IMEWS Early Warning Space System (the DSP Program), which is outfitted with IMEWS-type satellites. It is designed for early detection of launches of ground- and sea-launched strategic missiles. Three or more operating and two to three reserve satellites are constantly in stationary orbit. They are stationed over the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian oceans in such a way as to allow the field of vision of the infrared telescopes mounted on the satellites to encompass strategic missile launch areas on the territory of potential adversaries, as well as ocean areas from which submarine-launched strategic missiles threatening the US could be launched. Data from the satellites are received by ground stations at Buckley Air Force Base (near Denver, Colorado, US) and in Nar-rander (Australia), from which the data are fed to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the US Air Force Space Command.

The first IMEWS-series satellite was launched on May 5, 1971. It was ferried into orbit by a Titan III booster rocket. In June 1981, a contract was concluded with the TRW firm for the production of a second generation of IMEWS satellites designed to be lofted into orbit by the Space Shuttle reusable transport craft. The first model of the second-generation IMEWS satellite was launched on November 29, 1987, by a Titan-34D booster rocket. In mid-1987, the US Air Force concluded a six-year contract with the same firm for the production of five more third-generation IMEWS satellites. The first satellite of the new series was launched into stationary orbit in mid-1989 by a Titan-4 booster rocket. Its large mass-dimensional characteristics made it possible to substantially increase the range of onboard equipment in comparison to the 13 previous satellites, five of which were first generation and eight, second generation.

On the new-generation of IMEWS satellites, the capacity of onboard electric power sources was increased by expanding the area of the solar batteries. The photoreceiver in the focal plane of the infrared telescope, which registers radiation in two spectral bands, was modified to prevent "blinding" of the satellite by radiation from ground lasers. The dimensions and sensitivity of the telescope were increased to allow more effective detection and identification of booster rockets and ballistic missiles. Provision was made for satellite-to-satellite communications capability in order to avoid data loss due to interference by the enemy and to lessen dependence on data-receiving centers sited outside the US, as well as for the capability of repeated data transmission in the event of interference. The onboard digital computer was upgraded in order to improve the accuracy of autonomous navigation rangings, as were sensors for detecting nuclear weapons tests in space and assessing their characteristics.

In producing the first-generation satellites, an equipment upgrading program was carried out with a view to ensuring the transition to second-generation satellites. Survivability of the present IMEWS space warning system was enhanced by placing mobile data-receiving stations into operation.

The second subsystem, known as BMEWS, is designed for early detection of ballistic missiles and consists of three radar posts: in Clear (Alaska, US), Thule (Greenland), and Fylingdales (Great Britain). The radar stations have a range of up to 4,800 kilometers and detect and track artificial earth satellites as well as both intercontinental and medium-range ballistic missiles.

Modernization of the radar station at Thule was completed in the summer of 1988. A computer-operated phased-array radar was set up there. Two antenna arrays provide 240 degrees in azimuth. Each one is 28 meters high and has 2,560 active elements generating a total power of .87 megawatts. To provide higher resolution, the radar station uses impulse coding and the compression technique. This makes it possible to combine maximum range provided by long impulses with higher resolution created by short impulses. A contract was concluded with the firm that carried out this modernization to modify the radar station in Fylingdales; the modernization consists in replacing the three tracking radars with new, phased-array radars. The new radar station will have three antenna arrays (each measuring 25.6 by 25.6 meters) providing circular scanning. The contract covers the technical development, production, configuration, installation, and testing of the equipment and software, which are designed to process and reproduce data from more than 2,500 antenna elements in each of three directions.

The antenna elements can work for both radiation and the reception of electromagnetic impulses. The operation of the antenna elements is controlled by a computer that can form directional patterns of the needed form. It is said that in comparison to the existing radar station, the modified one will be more effective in providing early warning of submarine-launched ballistic missiles from any direction. It will also be able to detect intercontinental ballistic missiles and medium-range missiles flying from the direction of Western Europe. In addition, this radar station will be able to track satellites.

Data from the station will be automatically fed to command posts in the US and Great Britain. A contract has been concluded with a British firm for the development, production, installation, and testing of a shielding system to protect against electromagnetic impulses for the radar post being modernized. The shielding means under development guarantee against interference from both electric power lines and power circuits. The protection will consist in constructing of a shielding envelope for the entire nine-story building. All electronic equipment in the radar station building will be housed in

three shielded chambers of modular construction. Modernization work is to be completed in late 1992. The radar post in Clear will undergo modernization at the same time.

The next subsystem is for notification of an attack by sea-launched missiles. Known as Pave Paws, it includes four AN/FPS-115 phased-array radar stations. These stations also serve to track intercontinental ballistic missiles and to monitor the space situation. Work on the Pave Paws program was begun in 1974. The first of the radar stations (Cape Cod, Massachusetts) was commissioned in 1979, and the fourth (in the vicinity of Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas), in 1987.

Each radar station is a 10-story building with three walls. Octangular antenna arrays (240 degrees in azimuth) with a girth of 31.4 meters are mounted on two of the walls. Each array has 5,376 solid-state active and passive photoreceiving elements. The base level is maintained when 1,792 of the total number of each array's elements are active. At radar station No. 2 (Beale Air Force Base, California), plans call for increasing the base level to six dB, for which the number of each antenna array's active elements will be increased to 3,584, and for radar station No. 3 (Robins Air Force Base, Georgia, US) to 10 dB, for which 5,376 elements of each antenna array will be active. These measures will require modification of the electric power distribution system and the water-cooling system.

In addition, plans call for modifying the equipment of radar stations Nos. 1 and 2 in order to bring it up to the same technical level as the equipment of radar station No. 3. This will make it possible to reduce operating costs, among other things. Modification will involve for the installation of a backup Modcomp computer with a 865 processor, made by the Control Data firm, to operate the radar station, as well as new equipment for processing the signal and new display consoles.

After its level is raised to 10 dB, it will also be possible to use radar station No. 3 in the SPACETRACK system to track space objects, replacing the obsolete AN/FPS-85 radar station at Eglin Air Force Base. In 1986, when radar station No. 3 became operational, the US Air Force stopped using the last AN/FPS-7 radar station at MacDill Base (Florida). The equipment of the Pave Paws radar station is noted for its high reliability. The mean time between failures is said to be 80,000 to 100,000 hours. When operating at base level (1,792 active elements on each array), the failure of 133 elements lowers the level by only 1 dB. On the average, one element goes out of order every 24 hours.

Each Pave Paws radar station is enclosed by two fences, the first at a distance of 300 meters, the second, 60 meters. The first fence is intended to prevent people and animals from penetrating the zone of increased electromagnetic radiation surrounding the radar station; the second is an element of the radar station security system.

Another subsystem, known as PARCS (radar detection and attack assessment) is designed to detect and track ballistic targets, to discriminate between reentry vehicles and dummy targets, and to accurately predict where reentry vehicles will impact. It consists of the PAR radar station, a control post, and communications lines. The PARCS system became operational in 1975.

The PAR radar station is located in Concrete [Konkrit] (Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota) and consists of a reinforced-concrete, "hardened" building nearly 40 meters tall. Its walls are 2.1 meters thick from a height of .9 meters to the roof. The phased-array antenna uses 6,144 photoreceiving elements. The field of view of the PAR radar, which is oriented northward, encompasses the trajectory pipeline [trubki] of the approach trajectories of enemy missiles launched over the North Pole. The radar station's range is currently about 4,000 kilometers. The radar's peak power is 10 megawatts. It is said that warning data from the PAR radar station can be received only six to 12 minutes before the reentry vehicles of enemy missiles impact. This is due to the fact that the PAK radar station is located much farther south than the BMEWS system radars, since it was initially designed for use in the Safeguard ABM system, which protects intercontinental ballistic missile operational sites in the vicinity of Minot Air Force Base and Grand Forks Air Force Base (both in North Dakota).

The PAR radar station performs the functions of early missile detection and assessment of the scale and character of a missile attack in several stages. In the first stage, the shortest, the radar, operating in a combined mode of early warning and space surveillance, locks on the object (the lock-on stage). In this mode, the radar operates in a sector of 130 degrees. The sector can subsequently be increased to 140 degrees. During the lock-on stage, a determination is made as to whether the observed object is moving in orbit or entering the atmosphere, for which it is compared with a catalogue of orbiting objects in the radar computer's memory. If the object is located at the limits of the field of view, the information received during the lock-on stage might be insufficient for making such a determination. In that event, the tracking stage begins. In order to determine whether the object is moving in orbit or entering the atmosphere in a combat situation, this stage also utilizes data from the BMEWS system tracking stations, which would be received by that time.

If it is determined that the object is a reentry vehicle, the radar automatically switches from the combined mode to the reentry vehicle tracking mode. The TG-1 stage initiates the amassing of data to determine the launch site of the ballistic missile and the likely site of reentry vehicle impact. Data stored in the radar computer's memory on the characteristics of enemy missile reentry vehicles will be used to distinguish them from dummy targets. All the data coming into the radar operators is simultaneously (via at least two independent communications channels) fed to the command post. As the

reentry vehicles approach US territory, the final tracking stage, or TG-2, begins. NORAD receives data with a prediction of the impact sites of all the detected reentry vehicles.

The accuracy of the prediction makes it possible to determine the specific targets being fired on. This information is also fed onto the display of the radar operation post. This manually operated reserve display helps to assess the reliability of data on a missile attack and insures against the occurrence of malfunctions in the automatic data transmission lines from the computer. Part of the display consists of a map with the flight trajectories of the enemy missile reentry vehicles from the pole, through Canadian territory, and over the US. Data from the PAR radar station will be used for early detection and the issuing of an alarm, as well in reporting to the President on the scale and character of the nuclear-missile attack.

The warning system combat command and control [boyevoye upravleniye] subsystem includes: the NORAD command post of the joint (US-Canadian coalitional) command of the North American continental aerospace defense and the US Air Force command post situated in Cheyenne Mountain (Colorado, US); operation centers and posts; and communications channels and lines.

In addition, the AN/FPS-85 and AN/FPS-108 radar stations from the SPACETRACK space surveillance system can be used for warning system tasks, as can individual radar stations of the "Pacific Ocean warning barrier," individual radar stations used to monitor ballistic missile test launches, and communications channels and lines of the US Defense Department.

For the most part, the existing system will reportedly be able to assess the scale and character of a nuclear-missile attack. Its operability is verified on the basis of monitoring results with respect to test launches of ballistic missiles by the likely adversary and of space booster rockets, as well as through computer modeling of detection processes.

Data from all subsystems are fed to NORAD and the US Air Force Command, processed, and passed on in the form of warning summaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the national command, headed by the US President, for analysis of the situation and decision-making.

Further upgrading of the nuclear-missile strike warning system will reportedly involve the following areas. First, modernization of the IMEWS system with a view to enhancing the survivability and reliability of its functioning. Second, the development of a new space-based system designed to detect and track intercontinental ballistic missiles in the active sector of the trajectory (the BSTS program). It is felt that BSTS satellites must be able to operate in the face of enemy countermeasures and to perform tasks that are more complex than those performed by the IMEWS satellites, namely, determination of the types of missiles launched; data relay to

components of the antimissile defense (ABM) system, and assessments of interception results. Third, the development of optical electronic detection data systems on manned aircraft and on probe rockets, with a view to enhancing the accuracy and reliability of information on specific threats to the US. Fourth, integration of the warning system with other specialized systems being developed under the SDI program in the interests of

antimissile defense, with a view to creating a unified US "Strategic Defense System."

On the whole, the trend toward further development of the warning system as one of the most important systems of data support for combat operations will continue in the future.

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Reports of Conversion from Stepnogorsk

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Single Edition p 2

[Article by PRAVDA correspondents T. Yesilbayev and V. Ryzhkov: "Versions of Conversion: Reportage from the City That Appears on No Map"]

[Text] Kazakh SSR—It is futile to look for Stepnogorsk on a map. There is no such city! However, here we are walking about its narrow, shadowy streets and enjoying its architecture, unable to believe our eyes. It turns out that it is a city with a population of thousands, with major industrial enterprises, palaces of culture, and a sports complex.

So who built this city so far from the main highways? It was the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Because Stepnogorsk's main "secret" task was and remains the recovery and enrichment of uranium for the defense industry and for nuclear power engineering. Of course, for a long time the road to the Tseliny Mining-and-Chemical Combine (TsGKhK) was closed to journalists. And when the curtain was finally raised everyone could see that "behind the scenes" almost Shakespearian passions were raging. Although the subject of the situation went by the quite typical name of "conversion."

In Stepnogorsk they did not expect conversion. Back in 1986 the command came down "from above": double the recovery and enrichment of uranium. The combine produced no other output. And suddenly, like a war horn, the signal for conversion came. The command was specific: Reduce uranium output 37 percent before 1990, and then reduce it by half.

"The directive simply took us aback," the combine director, Leonid Luchina, recalls. "It was necessary to displace recovery at the mines and hence find work for the miners, experts, and scientists. How can such a difficult knot be untied all at once? But there was no time to dither. It was therefore very important to determine the main directions of conversion immediately."

There were many disputes. Finally the most convincing arguments won. First it was decided not to move too far from the original profile. Reliable technology was operating at the combine for extracting the useful components from various kinds of raw materials. This was taken as the basis for the conversion process. Second, it was decided to link the new directions directly with the interests of the republic.

This was the turn that prompted the specific programs. For example, Kazakhstan, the master of large reserves of gold-bearing ores, virtually did not have its own "filthy lucre." All the concentrate used to be sent to other parts of the country for refining. We therefore drew up the "Kazakhstan Gold" long-term program. The gold will be recovered from the waste from the production of sulfuric acid.

Another avenue is just as promising. In future the enterprise will start processing the "tailings" from the mining enterprises and enrichment factories. Capacities freed up from uranium enrichment will be used for this. There is a great deal of industrial waste in the republic. Today it is lying useless in dumps. For example, the "waste" from the Sokolovsko-Sarbaykiy Combine alone totals 200 million tons. It contains sulfur, nickel, vanadium, and other rare-earth elements. Kazakhstan has to spend billions of rubles to acquire them. With the involvement of the TsGKhK program, costs will fall to R250 million.

Or take this idea for diamond recovery. At the Kumdykolskiy deposit, which has been transferred to the people in Stepnogorsk, there is enough work for many years.

The combine's machine-building plants have assumed a large share of the conversion program. They are already producing equipment for the agro-industrial complex. In addition the production of sports training equipment, lamps, noodle-cutting machines, pedestals for television sets, fertilizers, and additives for various kinds of oils has already been organized.

So, is conversion proceeding at full speed in Stepnogorsk?

"You are wrong there," L. Luchina remarks bitterly. "Today things are twice as complicated for the former defense enterprises. On the one hand there is conversion, on the other, the market. There are shortages of materials. The state order is being fulfilled only 60 to 65 percent, and the figure is even lower for capital investments. It has become difficult to set things up with suppliers; they are really exploiting us: Well, they say, you are rich, you can afford it. For example, the Apatity Combine in Murmansk Oblast was asking R600,000 from the enterprise fund to develop its own production facilities, and even wanted imported goods worth R300,000. I believe that the state is obliged to provide protection for converting enterprises when times are difficult."

It is difficult to disagree with him. For conversion is one of the most important reserves in stabilizing the economy and saturating the market with goods now in short supply. For example, at the Rudnenskiy Chemical Fibers Plant in Kustanay Oblast, which previously worked totally for the defense industry, they have been learning how to produce ball bearings that do not require lubrication, and parts for pumps that operate in any medium. And they are made not from metal but from materials based on carbon fiber and carbon tape.

The plant director, Nikolay Kaftanaty, proudly showed samples of flat irons they had made from composite materials that last for almost 20 years and require 34(!) times less electricity than those that industry is producing today. Previously the composites were used as heating elements in space vehicles and satellites. Now, for the first time in the country, during the fourth quarter

the Rudnenskiy Plant will begin production of flat irons made from the wonder material.

Another feature of the composites is their extensive range of applications in medicine. For example, X-ray cassettes made from this material enable the radiation dose to be reduced by a factor of five to seven, and they improve contrast on the pictures. The high carbon content in the composites makes them irreplaceable in orthopedics.

"According to our calculations," says N. Kaftanatiy, "when we reach production capacity we shall be producing consumer goods worth R120 million to R150 million annually. As you can see, the prospects for the use of composite materials are very exciting. But we need R30 million to bring them on line and set up a plant complete with all main services to produce chemical fibers. Meanwhile, because of conversion matters, for some reason financing for our plant has been cut off this year. We managed to open it only with great difficulty. Another problem is that there is no funding for scientific research even though the possibilities for the use of composites have not been thoroughly studied."

We add that we need a law on conversion. It would help in resolving many of the problems that are today becoming chronic. For example, in Stepnogorsk the miners are in a particularly bad situation. The mines are being closed, so where will the miners go? And what about the position with respect to privileges and long-service bonuses? The workers have been left without social protection. There are many difficulties also with respect to forming the funds that are needed, including the social funds. The TsGKhK needs R20 million just to pay out compensation. In addition, it would be a good thing to reduce the cost of meals and increase spending for business travel.

In short, radical measures are needed to make full use of the potential of the defense enterprises. Today much depends on how efficiently the republics pursue their independent economic policies, which are organically combined with the possibilities and reserves of the labor collectives that have set out on the road of conversion.

Defense Plant Diversifies into Security Systems

PM1309082391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 10 Sep 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by I. Minayev and Yu. Gvozdz, identified by caption]

[Text]

[Minayev] This is the "Eleron" Science and Production Association. Until recently few people knew what this pleasant-sounding name stood for. And, of course, no journalist had ever set foot here. Even today it's very difficult to get inside—although it is now possible. Conversion is even opening doors like these. Until dishonest people disappear from the world—and that

doesn't look likely any time soon—"Eleron's" products will be in demand. That's because it conceives, designs, and produces technical security equipment for the most varied facilities. It was "Eleron" which was tasked at very short notice with setting up a protective signaling system around Chernobyl. It is "Eleron" that is responsible for security systems at all the country's nuclear power stations. Currently, for instance, specialists are working on an electronic security system for the Tretyakov Art Gallery. [Video shows V.V. Kuzmichev, deputy general director of the "Eleron" Science and Production Association, identified by caption]

[Kuzmichev] Our association is working on the "Onega" security system to protect apartments in our city. We develop technical security systems for cars, dachas, truck gardens...

[Minayev] Western businessmen too are very keen on the newly declassified "Eleron." The "Eleron" experience is a real example of conversion and shows that oil and timber aren't the only things we can sell to the West.

Shops Created To Dismantle Old Fighters for Metal

91SV0101A Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
20 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Major A. Vetakh: "A Plane Is... Retiring—A Report From a Shop Where Retired Aircraft Are Cut Up"]

[Text] This shop for dismantling interceptor planes was created recently, after the signing of the treaty on reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. Major Yu. Baryshev is chief of the shop. Previously, aviation experts engaged here in work on storage and subsequent scrapping of retired planes of the obsolete MiG-17, MiG-19, SU-9 types, and others.

As recently as several months ago, a "cemetery" of the once menacing winged vehicles, famous in the air force garrison, was located in a birch tree forest close to the production structures of the base; in essence, more than 80 bodies of interceptor planes in it were nobody's property. Boys and local craftsmen found a lot of valuable parts and assemblies here, all kinds of things which were left in the vehicles.

For a long time, dozens of tons of expensive aluminum and high-grade alloyed steel sat underfoot. It appears that in the years of our universal mismanagement nobody tried to put them to any use. One of the officers who has served here for quite a number of years told me that on one occasion, before a visit to the garrison by the army top brass, his unit had to urgently move dozens of aircraft from the parking area to the nearest forest in order not to incur unnecessary questions, to say nothing of the generals' wrath. Specialists had to accomplish this operation before each visit to the base by some highly placed guest.

Fortunately, good changes finally reached here, too. There finally was some movement on the issue of nobody's planes and of saving the beautiful forest. The chiefs had to consider the economic aspect of the issue. An appropriate contract was signed with the Bratsk Aluminum Plant. Recently, a team of plant personnel arrived here and shipped by railway dozens of tons of "flying" metal to be remelted. Naturally it was advantageous for both parties. However, traces of former mismanagement still linger in places. For example, I saw the cylinder block of a piston aircraft engine, the broken cockpit canopy of an SU-9 interceptor plane, several oxygen and nitrogen bottles, a hydraulic actuator, and many other plane parts and assemblies.

Following a reorganization, Major Baryshev's subordinates have to accomplish qualitatively new tasks. In the immediate future they will have to cut up interceptor planes which have been scheduled for liquidation, in keeping with documents awaiting ratification.

At present 135 Su-15 and MiG-23 interceptor fighters are located here. It is precisely this number of winged vehicles that will have to be cut up and remelted on a schedule strictly coordinated with the Western side. Meanwhile, Western military observers are entitled to inspect the process of eliminating the planes on site at any time.

The following case shows how vital this task is. In the spring, the Western side suddenly lodged a protest in conjunction with the fact that at the time of a deadline set in the treaty, 150 vehicles were found at the airfield instead of the 135 interceptor planes due to be cut up. The difference was established by means of satellite intelligence. A protest is a serious thing. However, it turned out that Baryshev's subordinates were not to blame for this violation. However, air force specialists had to hastily cut up the 15 "surplus" Su-15's.

This case shows graphically how precise and well-coordinated the interaction of all organizations and services, which are privy to an endeavor as significant and as extremely responsible as arms reductions, should be.

What does an aircraft dismantling shop amount to? There are three sections, each of which performs a high volume of technological operations. In the first, the mechanical, section, headed by Captain Ye. Yashchanov, technicians and mechanics of all specialties dismantle the engines, numerous aggregates and assemblies, and instruments, and remove tens of kilometers of electric wiring inside the fuselage. Radio and flight equipment which is obsolete or whose service life has been exceeded, and assemblies containing gold, silver, or platinum are sent to the warehouse, and are subsequently shipped to a plant for processing aimed at separating precious metals. There is a lot of such equipment on the planes.

After testing for defects, some of the equipment is shipped to aircraft technical materiel depots and is later used as spare parts.

In the assembly section, the subordinates of Captain V. Babyrshin cut up the fuselage, docking assembly, and tail assembly using welding sets. Actually, it is based on the results of the work of the welders that foreign military experts can ascertain that a plane cannot be restored to operate anew. In the third section, specialists record metal scrap and precious metals which are turned in. The amount of gold, silver, and platinum contained in equipment and aggregates shipped for processing, is counted to the tenths. The removed aircraft engines are used in target drones on which our pilots and air defense personnel practice combat firing.

Some of the planes which have served their time have taken positions on pedestals in air force settlements. Some are used for training students at military-patriotic clubs, schools of young cosmonauts, and students of aviation colleges. Metal remelted in the furnaces of aluminum plants will yet serve our aviation and the national economy. To be sure, some aviation specialists have come out in favor of selling it for foreign exchange. In the process, at least one or two percent of the proceeds should be retained for the development of military settlements. To date, the subordinates of Major Baryshev, whose highly skilled labor yields substantial profits for the state, have received bonuses of 20 rubles each. This was for all of last year.

Thanks to television, all of us perhaps got the impression that big-time politics is made at round tables, with studio lights shining and photo flashes blinking. However, signing treaties is merely the first and outwardly pretty step. Later, the mundane routines of working days begin.

Strateg Official on Military-Industrial Exchange

91SV0112A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
24 Sep 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with the small enterprise Strateg Director Mikhail Nikolayevich Yakunin by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain 3d Rank V. Maryukha under the rubric "The Military-Industrial Exchange"; place and date not given: "Against Unprofitable Conversion"]

[Text] I will acknowledge in all honesty that I learned of the Military-Industrial Exchange... by reading an advertisement on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. I thought at the time that here was yet another commercial structure that would grow fat off the profitable resale of military materiel and hardware, the same way the commercial centers of the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply [Gossnab] received dividends for their part without any particular efforts. But curiosity overpowered my biased attitude anyway, and here is what I found out about the Military-Industrial Exchange and the small enterprise Strateg that was created as its brokerage office.

[Yakunin] The idea of creating the Military-Industrial Exchange [VPB] was conclusively formulated in May, and we had already set to work in the second half of August of this year. The Russian Commodities and Raw-Materials Exchange, a number of leading enterprises in the defense-industrial complex and the Ministry of Defense were our founders. The makeup of these founders largely explains our choice of activity in market structures, and the sharp reduction in appropriations for defense needs and the almost complete lack of them for the intelligent pursuit of conversion were the grounds for it. We have moreover been working for some time as interns at the Russian Commodities and Raw-Materials Exchange and, coming into contact with the interests of the military units and the defense industry, we became convinced of the necessity of bringing out the opportunities possessed by the Army and the enterprises that were suffering colossal losses in the process of conversion.

Most of the people who have come to the exchange are serious people interested in working respectably and honestly. And we in no way intend to grow fat off the problems that are arising in the army on the wave of radical reforms. On the contrary, the VPB structures—and they will be a whole series of small enterprises, of which the exchange will be a cofounder in the future—will take on a great deal of what worries the military today. The presale preparation of hardware and material, for instance, for which a considerable number of personnel have to be separated from their combat training. And those who leave the Army in the process of its cutback will work at the enterprise.

[Maryukha] And what else, in your view, could the military offer with your mediation?

[Yakunin] There is a lot of hardware in the Army that could be sold profitably in the national economy, given the appropriate retrofitting. The military have quite a few guarded warehouses that business people need very much. Their leasing at exchange rates would bring in a great deal of income, as could, for example, services in shipping freight under the guard of servicemen. Moreover, the exchange will make it possible to straighten out commercial shipping, which the military already perform from time to time, and will provide an opportunity to earn much more than they are being paid for it today.

[Maryukha] And what is the vested interest of the military-industrial complex, and in particular those enterprises that are among the founders?

[Yakunin] The activity of the Military-Industrial Exchange will be accomplished on two levels, as it were—open and closed. In the first case we will be working with the rights of sections at all existing exchanges, including abroad, which will give us an opportunity to sell our orders to the greatest advantage in those regions where there is the greatest demand and, correspondingly, the highest price. The second level is something like an exchange for internal use. Here the

latest technology and closed projects will be offered, with the enterprises that have undergone conversion trading in them on a contract basis.

We will moreover be looking for customers for the products of the producers and developers of new hardware. They are often unable to recoup the spending on its production, after having done a great deal of work and created unique apparatus or equipment—centralized financing will remain at the 1990 level in the best case at many enterprises.

[Maryukha] If it is not a business secret, what orders have already been placed at the exchange and what will be offered in the near future?

[Yakunin] As I was saying, we have been working for just a handful of days. We entered into exchange activity with zero in our business account—our founders were unable to allocate us any funds, as they say, for getting established. We can thus talk only of the first deals that we have made on the Russian Commodities and Raw-Materials Exchange.

Despite the advertising announcement published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, military “dealers” are not yet in any hurry to post their orders through us; an exchange for goods and services is still terra incognita for an absolute majority of them. But at the same time, many are calling or coming in who would like to know, but do not, how to realize their potential opportunities allowing for the specific military nature of the nascent market.

Among industry orders I can cite the project of the enterprise at which I was working as a department chief until recently. This is a navigational system for light aviation and an installation able to determine the location of a drilling bit with great precision up to two kilometers on the vertical and one kilometer on the horizontal. I am sure that this latter development, conforming to world standards, will be of interest not only to petroleum workers, but also to those who have to lay down cable rights-of-way, opening up the surfaces of roads and overpasses.

[Maryukha] Mikhail Nikolayevich, what about the Military-Industrial Exchange attracted you personally, why did you prefer the risk of an entrepreneur to the guaranteed salary of a state worker at a “post office box” plant?

[Yakunin] I was unable to feed my family even with two higher degrees. Statements that the earnings are stupendous at enterprises in the military-industrial complex are myths. The exchange provides no guarantees of stable earnings, but here what I receive depends on what I do. And that gives me a feeling of moral satisfaction—I get money for my labor, and not for the fact that I simply go to work.

[Maryukha] What would you like to wish to your future clients among the military subunits?

[Yakunin] There is no need to be afraid of the exchange—no one intends to clean up or live at your

expense. We are taking upon ourselves some of your concerns and providing you with the maximum profit. I hope that we will become reliable partners.

[Maryukha] Well then, in that case I wish you success. As the sailors say, seven feet under the keel of your exchange ship.

[Yakunin] Thank you for your good wishes and for the fact that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has offered us an opportunity to publish the advertisements. That is the start of our mutual partnership relations with the newspaper through which the link between the Armed Forces and society is maintained.

Finance Chief on Unit Work Contracts for Profit

91SV0104A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
18 Sep 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Major General V. Medvedenko, chief of administration of the Central Financial Administration, USSR Ministry of Defense, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major I. Ivanyuk; place and date not given: "The Officer's Sign: Mars or Mercury?"]

[Text] The fact that several days ago, Directive D-57 concerning the invigoration and streamlining of financial and economic operations in the USSR Armed Forces was signed, prompted us to put the above question, as well as a number of others, to Major General V. Medvedenko, an administration chief at the Central Financial Administration of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

In particular, the directive is aimed at increasing the involvement and independence of commanders and chiefs of all echelons in the endeavor to secure funds for solving the social and housing problems of the Army and the Navy.

[Ivanyuk] So, Vasiliy Fedorovich, will officers now have to spend some time in the service of the god of commerce, Mercury?

[Medvedenko] Let us be honest about it: They have already been doing this. Alas, the proposed expansion of the sources of self-financing of military units, enterprises, and organizations in keeping with the directive of the minister of defense is a forced measure. Our poverty is the reason for all of this. Now that the supply of everything necessary to the armed forces has been disrupted, while commodity exchanges are not yet operating full tilt, there is simply no other way out than to reinforce economic relations ourselves, thus expanding sources for the intake of material resources and funds.

However, despite everything, I believe that a time will come when the troops will engage in their direct business—combat training, whereas the Ministry of Defense will have the necessary funds in order to procure everything it needs from the national economy. I mean not only materiel and foodstuffs but also, for example, construction of facilities, materiel repairs, and so on.

[Ivanyuk] What is proposed for now?

[Medvedenko] Military units, offices, military educational establishments, enterprises, and organizations of the Ministry of Defense, which are financed through budget and cost-estimate procedures, are allowed to sign contracts for the performance of work and rendering of services to outside consumers. In the process, they may independently dispose of the profits remaining after the payment of taxes and other withholdings. Naturally, all of this should not be done to the detriment of combat training.

[Ivanyuk] What does "not to the detriment of combat training" mean? Can a regiment, or for example, an

entire division spend months doing farm work, the quality of combat training will not suffer because of this? To your mind, what criterion can be used in this matter?

[Medvedenko] I absolutely agree with you. As far as combat units are concerned, I believe that there is no way that they can do without a loss to combat readiness, all the more so because possible reductions in the length of compulsory military service are being worked on. The question is: When are they supposed to master military occupations? However, the Army now brings in the crops and takes part in other work because we are not doing well. The Army will have to continue doing this for a certain period of time.

As far as economically accountable enterprises and organizations are concerned, the criterion of feasibility for "outside" work is very simple—it is filling completely compulsory orders for the delivery of products for the needs of defense. Now that the Armed Forces are being reduced, production capacity is also being released, for example, that for repairs of materiel and weapons. Naturally, it should not remain idle. Besides, people who are involved in production cannot be left with nothing to do. After all, they have families to support. Therefore, the directive provides for looking for opportunities to expand the production of consumer goods and the provision of paid services to the populace.

[Ivanyuk] Let us say that economically accountable organizations had a high degree of freedom even before. To my mind, the main problem for the commanders of military units was not to earn some money, but rather to manage the money already available at their discretion.

[Medvedenko] The directive signed opens new opportunities for those "financed from the budget" in this sphere as well. Thus, it is permissible to use the balance of funds at the end of the year in the new budgetary year for their original purpose. Let me recall that previously, a military unit or, for example, office, lost that money. In addition, it is permissible to establish position salaries for workers and employees, within the limits of the adopted wage fund, without complying with the average fund of staff position salaries according to the tables of organization. In addition, all kinds of bonuses and awards will no longer be restricted by maximum volumes.

[Ivanyuk] However, in many cases, the wages of workers and clerical employees cannot be increased substantially within the existing wage fund, all contrivances notwithstanding...

[Medvedenko] Indeed, given the current growth of prices and existing salaries, even an increment of 20 to 30 percent will not appear very substantial, but at least it is something. The point is that nobody has canceled the laws on remuneration for labor at state enterprises and in offices which are now in effect. We cannot ignore them either.

[Ivanyuk] Vasiliy Fedorovich, at present, officers also have to think about how to support their families. The

directive suggests that there might be something for them in invigorating economic operations by the troops. For example, the plan is to submit proposals on procedures for the use of funds for material and energy resources saved and bonuses for the personnel to the government by 1 January 1992. [as published] At the same time, many people propose a more radical way: to allow officers and warrant officers to engage in entrepreneurial activities directly, naturally, not at the expense of the service.

[Medvedenko] I categorically rule out such a possibility. It will not happen other than at the expense of the service. If, for example, an officer wishes to buy stocks, he is welcome. However, getting distracted from service responsibilities in order to ensure additional earnings on top of one's pay is ruled out. I am profoundly convinced that the state should create all necessary conditions for the people opting for the pursuit of career military service so that they would not need to moonlight.

[Ivanyuk] However, first, it does not actually work that way at present. Second, officers who serve in economically accountable organizations now have an opportunity to earn up to 10 to 12 salaries per year if they work well and vigorously. [as published] You would agree that this is entrepreneurship of sorts.

[Medvedenko] In essence you mean military construction employees. After all, there are not too many cadre servicemen at enterprises. Indeed, while they do not receive a one-time monetary grant at the end of the year, they nonetheless have an opportunity to earn—I stress, to earn—good money. However, it cannot be otherwise: All economic operations would grind to a halt in the absence of this, and any efficiency will be out of the question. I have already stated my position: Construction is a phenomenon alien within the framework of the Armed Forces, as well as other production activities. I think that all of this will somehow be put in order as new economic relations develop.

As far as the social protection of servicemen is concerned, certain steps are now being taken. In particular, it has been resolved to increase the position salaries of servicemen effective 1 October. The directive which we

are discussing calls for coordinating with proper government organs the question of issuing, effective 1 January 1992, free food rations to officers who are not entitled to receive foodstuffs at the expense of the state.

For its part, the Central Financial Administration is studying opportunities for additional measures ultimately aimed at allowing people who have dedicated their lives to defending the Motherland to devote themselves to this pursuit entirely, rather than thinking of how to become businessmen at the same time.

Personnel Directorate First Deputy Chief Biosketch

92UM0006A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
1 Oct 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Appointments"]

[Text] By ukase of the USSR president, Lieutenant General V. Yakovlev has been appointed first deputy chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

Lieutenant General Valentin Alekseyevich YAKOVLEV

Born 7 May 1942 in the village of Novyy Toryal, Mari ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], Lieutenant General Yakovlev completed the Leningrad Higher Combined-Arms Command Institute imeni S.M. Kirov in 1965. He began his troop duty as platoon leader in a marine regiment. He then became a company commander. In 1972, after completing the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, he was appointed chief of staff-deputy commander of a separate marine regiment, and in 1974 was appointed commander of a separate marine regiment of the Black Sea Fleet. In 1978 he became chief of staff-deputy commander of a motorized rifle division, and in 1979, commander of a motorized rifle division in the Odessa Military District. In 1980 he served as commander of a marine division of the Pacific Fleet. In 1984 he completed the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff. In 1984 he served as commander of an Army corps in Odessa Military District. In 1988 he was appointed chief of a directorate in the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

He is married and has two children.

OMON Settled in Tyumen Pioneer Camp

*LD1009210391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak
Network in Russian 2230 GMT 9 Sep 91*

[Text] The members of OMON [special purpose militia detachment] transferred to Tyumen from Riga—the URALAKTSENT agency reports—have temporarily been settled in the Young Dzerzhinskiy Follower pioneer camp. Seven families arrived with the detachment. The fathers have already started guard duty around the town, but it as yet unknown when the children will be able to go to school and kindergarten and wives can get work.

Riga OMON Hired by Tyumen Commodity Exchange

*91SV0120A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 18 Sep 91 p 3*

[URAL-AKTSENT article: "OMON Puts Its Foot Down"]

[Text] Tyumen—Having moved to Tyumen, the Riga OMON [special-purpose militia detachment] has seriously gotten down to business. During the first week it has helped solve 20 crimes. Among them were hooliganism, theft, car theft, speculation in vodka, storage of ammunition, and narcotics. Racketeers taking "protection money" from the chairman of a small enterprise were caught red-handed.

The leaders of the Tyumen Commodity Stock Exchange allotted a round sum for maintaining the Riga OMON. Exchange President Sergey Denisov explained his decision by the fact that the OMON members had come without financial accounts or money. How could they refuse to help them?

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